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The Future of Facial Recognition Is Not 
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Security Regulatory Mechanisms for 
Facial Recognition in the Retail Sector 
Elias Wright* 
In recent years, advances in facial recognition technology have 
resulted in a rapid expansion in the prevalence of private sector 
biometric technologies. Facial recognition, while providing new 
potentials for safety and security and personalized marketing by 
retailers implicates complicated questions about the nature of 
consumer privacy and surveillance where a “collection imperative” 
incentivize corporate actors to accumulate increasingly massive 
reservoirs of consumer data. However, the law has not yet fully 
developed to address the unique risks to consumers through the use 
of this technology. 
This Note examines existing regulatory mechanisms, finding 
that consumer sensitivities and the opaque nature of the technology 
have resulted in over- and underinclusive regulatory regimes. This 
Note proposes that the broad implications of biometric privacy 
harms justify more extensive privacy regulation than a narrow focus 
on data security and self-regulation. It suggests that regulation 
predicated on consumer data self-management is inefficient in 
controlling the flow of information generated by facial recognition. 
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This Note finds that a regulatory approach based in collaborative 
governance may be better suited for regulating complex systems that 
create hard-to-calculate risks, change too quickly for traditional 
regulatory approaches, and involve technical and industry expertise 
that regulators and legislators are unlikely to have. 
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   INTRODUCTION 
“Well, all information looks like noise until you 
break the code.”1 
In Steven Spielberg’s 2002 science fiction film Minority Report, 
John Anderton’s face is scanned as he walks into a futuristic version 
of the retail store Gap.2 A hologram personally greets him and 
prompts him on his recent experience with purchasing “assorted 
tank tops.”3 What was considered science fiction seventeen years 
ago now rapidly approaches reality as retailers adopt commercial 
applications of facial recognition technology for functions including 
safety and security, secure payment, marketing, and customer 
service.4 While the extent of current commercial use of biometrics 
 
1 NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 74 (1992). 
2 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-621, FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY: COMMERCIAL USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 6, 38 
(2015). 
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is not fully known, this technology presents potential benefits and 
risks for both retailers and consumers.5 
Use of facial recognition technology can identify customers, 
preventing fraud and providing “VIP services,”6 as well as 
recognizing individuals with known shoplifting convictions.7 While 
the prevalence of this technology may improve the retail experience 
by offering convenience and individualized service, these 
technologies are generating and storing vast amounts of sensitive 
information about individuals’ movements, preferences, and 
associations.8 Retailers, using biometric data for the aggregation of 
customer profiles, are creating valuable databases that are more 
sensitive to the risk of breach.9 How this data is collected, stored, 
used, and shared may result in negative consequences for consumers 
walking into public retail establishments. 
Privacy advocates and scholars have flagged the expanding use 
of biometric data as a concerning area for consumers.10 As biometric 
techniques generate and use novel forms of information, scholars 
emphasize that there is presently little legal oversight covering 
techniques of collection, storage, and usage.11 
 
5 Id. at 10. 
6 Brenda Salinas, High-End Stores Use Facial Recognition Tools to Spot VIPs, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 21, 2013, 6:21 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered
/2013/07/21/203273764/high-end-stores-use-facial-recognition-tools-to-spot-vips 
[https://perma.cc/9VGP-Q755]. 
7 Chavie Lieber, Your Favorite Store Could Be Tracking You with Facial Recognition, 
RACKED (May 22, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.racked.com/2018/5/22/17380410/facial-
recognition-technology-retail [https://perma.cc/FL4Q-CNUL]. 
8 Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1127-28, 1131 (2015). 
9 John Tengberg, Inter-Organizational Information Sharing of Customer Data in Retail 
4, 7–9, 22–23 (Composite Info. Sys. Lab., Working Paper No. 2013-09), http://web.mit.edu
/smadnick/www/wp/2013-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P4Y-QX3P]. 
10 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool 
for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-
the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/47AP-JAXB]. 
11 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250–51, 255 
(2007); Jenna Bitar & Jay Stanley, Are Stores You Shop at Secretly Using Facial 
Recognition on You?, ACLU (Mar. 26, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.aclu.org
/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/are-stores-you-shop-secretly-using-
face [https://perma.cc/HL5L-V7GV]. 
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This Note examines the way in which existing institutional 
structures and consumer anxieties have resulted in over- and 
underinclusive regulatory regimes when confronted with an 
emerging technology form. The failures and successes expose which 
measures in law and policy may best protect consumers from the 
collection and use of biometric information by commercial non-
governmental actors in retail settings. 
Part I of this Note describes the history, technological 
background, and unique privacy risks of surveillance from biometric 
facial recognition technologies. It outlines the development of 
private sector uses of facial recognition in brick-and-mortar retail 
settings. This Part then demonstrates the tension between consumer 
privacy sensitivities and the emerging utility of facial biometric data 
to retailors for structuring consumer demographics, habit, and 
preference data into a machine-readable format when collected from 
existing closed-circuit television cameras. 
Part II explores current laws that protect consumer biometric 
data. This Part then discusses how current laws have been utilized 
to protect consumer privacy, alongside alternate regulatory 
enforcement mechanisms that could be used where an act or practice 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is 
not reasonably avoidable by consumers, nor outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 
Part III considers the availability and shortcomings of current 
regulatory approaches for emerging facial recognition technologies. 
This Part examines the potential of an individual rights regime, 
using the example of Illinois’ BIPA as a model of this approach. Part 
III then considers the FTC’s managerial regime, in which a 
regulatory “light touch” serves as a backstop to industry self-
regulation. Finally, this Part evaluates problems of the present 
incentive structures and market failures of self-regulatory regimes 
that may impede the development of an effective collaborative 
governance regime. 
The final section, Part IV, considers that the incentive structures 
of the present regulatory regimes, emphasizing consumer data self-
management and market self-correction, are inadequate in 
addressing the unique issues of facial recognition. This Part suggests 
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that the FTC’s “light touch” approach alone is unlikely to develop 
enforceable norms and standards. However, this Part suggests that 
FTC’s role as a “norm entrepreneur” makes it ideally situated to 
engage in collaborative governance process, which has the potential 
for meaningful regulation. 
I. BACKGROUND: PRIVACY IN A LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATE 
BIOMETRIC SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
In recent years, the rapid expansion in prevalence of private 
sector biometric technologies implicates complicated questions 
about the nature of consumer privacy and surveillance. As retailers 
target individual consumers and define them through classification 
systems according to a hierarchy of value, they subject consumers 
to new risks and potentials.12 This Note considers how these 
potential harms should be conceptualized and what type of remedies 
best address and moderate consumer risks. 
Section I.A traces the sociohistorical development of biometrics 
and then discusses the technological basis and relevant uses and 
risks of biometrics in the private-sector. Section I.B describes the 
specific risks inherent to the collection, aggregation, and profile 
creation using biometric data. Section I.C describes the present 
applications of biometrics in retail and unique issues with facial 
recognition databases. 
A. The Current Technological Context 
Biometric identifiers allow private-sector users to monitor 
individuals within a constrained space, noninvasively, from a 
distance, and without the consumer’s knowledge. The incorporation 
of biometrics, such as facial recognition, into existing closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) devices, provides an additional layer of data to 
private surveillance technologies. This biometric overlay allows 
private-sector users to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of 
individuals within retail environments, linking new inputs to already 
existing reservoirs of data, such as past purchases, interests, 
 
12 See JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING, 
STRIP YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 194 (2017). 
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immediate family members, or criminal records, collected by the 
retailer or purchased from data aggregators.13 
1. A Brief Sociotechnical History of Biometrics 
The conceptual underpinnings of identifying individuals using 
biometric markers emerged with the development of the new 
communications technologies in the nineteenth century, such as 
telegraphy, photography, and telephony.14 Visual reproduction 
technologies were developed that could analyze, classify, and 
identify the structure of human faces.15 New photography 
technologies transformed social perceptions of identity and 
privacy.16 The nineteenth-century pseudoscience of physiognomy 
believed, for example, that people’s faces bore the signs of their 
essential qualities and could be visually analyzed as a means of 
measuring their moral worth.17 
With the development of computerization, facial recognition in 
the United States was developed as a public-private venture, funded 
and shaped to military priorities.18 From the 1960s through the 
1990s automated facial recognition research was primarily funded 
through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).19 The goal of automated facial recognition was assisting 
the military to identify, at a distance, specific individuals among 
 
13 See id. at 109. 
14 KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 12, 18–19 (2011). 
15 Id. 
16 See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST 15–16 (2018) (discussing the advent of 
the Kodak instantaneous camera as a basis for Samael Warren & Louis Brandeis’ Right to 
Privacy); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 195 (1890) (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”). 
17 Blaise Agüera y Arcas, Margaret Mitchell & Alexander Todorov, Physiognomy’s New 
Clothes, MEDIUM (May 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@blaisea/physiognomys-new-
clothes-f2d4b59fdd6a [https://perma.cc/6CJF-VW6X] (discussing the dangers of applying 
physiognomy through AI due to its historically deeply prejudiced applications in the 
criminal law where “primitive type[s] of people” were more “prone to crime” and 
applications by Nazi “race scientists” to suggest evolutionary inferiority). 
18 GATES, supra note 14, at 29. 
19 Id.  
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enemy ranks and surrounding sensitive locations, such as military 
bases.20 
Private sector interest in facial recognition has focused on 
adapting the technology to CCTV.21 CCTV, while a low-cost 
method for expanding the surveillance capabilities of public and 
private actors, poses a problem of high labor costs in both the 
quantity of staff and time needed for monitoring footage.22 From the 
1990s to the early 2000s, DARPA and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) sponsored testing aimed at 
solving issues with integrating facial recognition to CCTV.23 The 
organizations, by resolving technological limitations and creating 
uniformity across systems, ultimately hoped to encourage the 
creation of a private-sector commercial market for biometric 
technologies.24 The resultant “Smart CCTV” would integrate 
automated facial recognition with video surveillance, creating new 
“algorithmic” forms of surveillance that could automatically 
manage the enormous amount of video imagery, providing accurate 
identification at a low labor cost.25 In short, though the private-
sector use of biometrics is nominally detached from the implications 
of governmental total-surveillance, similar sociological risks 
permeate the technology’s development and the resulting effects on 
consumers. 
Facial recognition’s use of the face as the source of code 
influences the sociological response to its incorporation into private-
sector systems.26 Contemporary cultural meanings associated with 
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 66. 
22 Id. at 64. 
23 Id. at 71; see also Face Recognition Technology (FERET), NIST (Jan. 25, 2011), 
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-technology-feret 
[https://perma.cc/7Y85-N7XV]. The Department of Defense (DoD) Counterdrug 
Technology Development Program Office sponsored the Face Recognition Technology 
(FERET) program, started in 1993. Id. The goal of the FERET program was to develop 
automatic face recognition capabilities that could be employed to assist security, 
intelligence, and law enforcement personnel in the performance of their duties. Id. 
24 GATES, supra note 14, at 58–59, 71. 
25 Id. at 64. 
26 See, e.g., Luke Dormehl, Facial Recognition: Is the Technology Taking Away Your 
Identity?, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
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the face are multivalent and dynamic—all individuals have faces 
and those faces are understood as inherently unique and a source of 
“identity.”27 This tracks with an enduring conception of the face as 
the “window to the soul”28—a location of centralized and 
concentrated significance for identity in the cultural imagination. 
Human societies are predicated on evolutionary abilities to 
individually recognize and track people in social networks.29 The 
face functions as a site of judgment, where community members can 
assess features and movements—facial expressions—for 
similarities and differences, providing a tool for assessing a known 
or unknown individual’s perceived mental state or threat level.30 The 
Oxford English Dictionary recognizes many different meanings of 
“face,” including: “[o]utward show; artificial or assumed expression 
or appearance; pretence”31 but also “[r]eputation, credit; honour, 
good name.”32 Simultaneously, the face has the symbolic qualities 
of an impermeable “image,” separating an individual’s internal 
thoughts and processes from an exterior world of interpreters.33 
Symbolism is itself a dynamic force; as philosopher Bruno Latour 
suggests, “[h]umans are not the ones who arbitrarily add the 
‘symbolic dimension’ to pure material forces.”34 Understood this 
way, the face—when used as code in computer-mediated 
technology—is an interface between cultural perceptions and 
physically apparent markers.35 The use of facial recognition as a 
 
/technology/2014/may/04/facial-recognition-technology-identity-tesco-ethical-issues 
[https://perma.cc/K2PG-JVJJ]. 
27 See generally Michael J. Sheehan & Michael W. Nachman, Morphological and 
Population Genomic Evidence that Human Faces Have Evolved to Signal Individual 
Identity, 5 NATURE COMM. 1 (2014). 
28 See Stephen Porter et al., Is the Face a Window to the Soul? Investigation of the 
Accuracy of Intuitive Judgments of the Trustworthiness of Human Faces, 40 CAN. J. OF 
BEHAV. SCI. 171, 176 (2008). 
29 Sheehan & Nachman, supra note 27, at 2. 
30 See GATES, supra note 14, at 11. 
31 Face, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry
/Entry/67425 [https://perma.cc/H6GQ-BXAA] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
32 Id. 
33 Cf. VILEM FLUSSER, TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 8 (1983). See also 
Tom Gunning, In Your Face: Physiognomy, Photography, and the Gnostic Mission of 
Early Film, 4 MODERNISM/MODERNITY 25 (1997). 
34 BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 128 (1993). 
35 See ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, THE INTERFACE EFFECT 18–22 (2012). 
620         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
networked surveillance technology degrades an already unstable 
division between embodied-space and “cyberspace.”36 Transcoding 
that results in a transformation from the depth of meanings 
expressed in the face to a machine-readable format reagitates a 
dormant “boundary anxiety” of reducing human uniqueness into 
deterministic binary.37 As a result, the latent symbolic and cultural 
value of the face used as a technological piece of code is impossible 
to disentangle from the mobile and multifaceted history of 
meanings, making its use and interpretation a site of heightened 
agitation and sensitivity.38 This latent cultural conception of the 
powers of facial recognition then colors the use and regulation of the 
technology. 
2. The Technology: How Does It Work and What Data is 
Being Generated 
Biometrics are technologies that allow for the automated 
recognition of individuals based on their behavioral and biological 
characteristics.39 Biometrics, as a tool,40 establishes confidence that 
one is dealing with individuals who are already known (or 
unknown)—and consequently that they belong to a group with 
certain rights (or to a group to be denied certain privileges).41 
Biometric data may be acquired from any source that visually 
documents an individual or that observes identifiable characteristics 
such as heart rate or odor.42 For consumers, biometric data may be 
collected in various contexts such as automated photo tagging on 
sites such as Facebook, activity and health monitoring through 
 
36 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 40–50 (2012). 
37 See GALLOWAY, supra note 35, at 18–22; Laura Shanner, Boundary Anxiety, 26 CAN. 
MED. ASS’N J. 1273, 1273 (2002). 
38 See GATES, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
39 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 1 (Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett, eds. 2010). 
40 By a “tool” this Note considers Foucault’s notion of “technologies of power” where 
the activity of exercising a technical goal generates information beyond the technical task 
and asserts control over how a subject is defined. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–228 (1995). 
41 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 39, at 1. 
42 Anil K. Jain et al., An Introduction to Biometric Recognition, 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON CIR. SYS. VIDEO TECH. 4, 4 (2004). 
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wearable technologies such as Fitbit, and even the gestures used 
when individuals interact with their phones and computers.43 
The private sector has adopted facial recognition as a commonly 
used biometric identifier.44 Automatic facial recognition methods 
collect biometric data on the characteristics of individuals faces 
through a step-by-step process.45 First, the system extracts patterns 
in an image and compares them against a model of a face, 
establishing the presence of a face.46 Second, a facial recognition 
algorithm registers the face and places it in a preset position, 
allowing for standardization of the image, so it is in the same format 
as the images in the database.47 The resultant data is referred to as a 
“faceprint.”48 The faceprint measurements and other collected 
information are “biometric data,” which are compiled into a 
database.49 Using the biometric database, faceprints may then allow 
for: (1) facial classification, by classifying the face into categories 
such as an estimation of gender, age or race; (2) verification, by 
comparing the similarity of previously stored faceprint of any 
particular individual to a new faceprint and establishing a 
confidence score that the two individuals are the same; and (3) 
identification, by comparing a person’s facial image to a database of 
stored faceprints.50 
In the past several years, underlying biometric technologies have 
consistently improved following increased investment and research 
in facial recognition systems.51 Newer systems have enhanced 
accuracy by incorporating neural networks, a machine-learning AI 
technique that is used to find an optimal function to solve a task from 
 
43 See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Hold the Phone! My Unsettling Discoveries About How Our 
Gestures Online Are Tracked, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/08/15/business/behavioral-biometrics-data-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/RQ9B-
FF7B]. 
44 See COMMERCIAL USES, supra note 4, at 7; see also Jain, supra note 42, at 9. 
45 COMMERCIAL USES, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 2–3, 11 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 1st ed. 
2005). 
50 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF FACIAL 
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES 4–5 (2012). 
51 COMMERCIAL USES, supra note 4, at 3. 
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a large number of inputs.52 As a result, facial recognition 
technologies available for private sector actors are more accurate, 
less expensive, and readily available from cloud software providers 
like AWS.53 
How faceprints in databases are compiled, structured, and stored 
may implicate privacy concerns. Using facial recognition requires 
accessing reference material through a multimedia database.54 A 
multimedia database is a database that contains one or more types 
of information such as text, image, video clip, sound, diagram, and 
graphical animation.55 The material in multimedia databases may be 
generated by the system and populated from a variety of sources. 
Various websites have collected facial images in the form of mug 
shots from an estimated seventy-eight million Americans with 
criminal records from police departments and sheriffs’ offices 
across the country.56 Even individuals who are arrested but never 
charged have their photos on these sites.57 The increasing public 
availability of facial images, especially as companies like Facebook 
pursue “real identity” policies, may result in an immense searchable 
multimedia database for previously unidentified individuals.58 
Face recognition systems are capable of matching faceprints 
with individuals’ names at times when consumers’ identities are 
 
52 Yana Welinder & Aeryn Palmer, Face Recognition, Real-Time Identification, and 
Beyond, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY, 3–4 (2018). 
53 See, e.g., Amazon Rekognition, AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/ [https://
perma.cc/5792-B4G2]; see also Justin Lee, Credence Research Report Forecasts 
Biometrics Market to Reach $34.5B by 2022, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (May 8, 2016), 
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201605/credence-research-report-forecasts-biometrics-
market-to-reach-34-5b-by-2022 [https://perma.cc/T59D-4Q4J]. 
54 N. Tsapatsoulis et al., Facial Image Indexing in Multimedia Databases, 4 PATTERN 
ANALYSIS & APPLICATIONS 93, 93–94 (2001). 
55 Id. at 93. 
56 Rebecca Beitsch, Fight Against Mugshot Sites Brings Little Success, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017
/12/11/fight-against-mugshot-sites-brings-little-success [https://perma.cc/R9E9-XNF5]. 
57 Id. 
58 See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Face Recognition and Privacy in the Age of Augmented 
Reality, 6 J. PRIVACY & COMM. 1, 1 (2014) (demonstrating through research the capability 
to reliably reidentify individuals offline using Facebook reference photos); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N , supra note 50, at 8 (“[The FTC] is not aware of companies currently 
using data in these ways, if they begin to do so, there would be significant privacy 
concerns.”). 
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known, such as when using CCTV to monitor store checkouts or 
returns when credit cards are used.59 Additionally, geo-fencing and 
passive Wi-Fi tracking may allow identification by matching a 
smartphone’s Device ID with a face scan.60 By collecting signals 
from a smartphone’s Wireless Positioning System (WPS) and 
Global Positioning System (GPS) connecting with a Wi-Fi network 
access point, a system may identify a user profile that has been 
created using the same phone.61 The system then could identify an 
individual’s faceprint by combining automated CCTV data with 
device information from Wi-Fi positioning.62 While this field is still 
developing, as facial recognition gains more widescale adoption, 
market forces likely will improve and expand upon automated 
identification techniques.63 
B. Privacy and Compounding Consumer Risks 
Biometrics provide a technology capable of real-time automated 
constant surveillance, exposing consumers to new privacy risks. The 
collection of data exposes consumers to the risk of their private 
information being shared with unintended recipients through the 
sale to third parties or data breaches.64 Consumers are already 
experiencing a “new normal,” in which companies routinely suffer 
from cyber-attacks that reveal the sensitive data of millions of 
consumers.65 Unlike financial information, biometric data is “more 
 
59 Evan Schuman, What’s the Truth Behind Walmart’s Failed Facial Recognition 
Trial?, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 11, 2015, 3:05 AM), https://www.computerworld.com
/article/3004166/retail-it/whats-the-truth-behind-walmarts-failed-facial-recognition-
trial.html [https://perma.cc/G3D4-P6YA]. 
60 Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your 
Cell, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention
-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/2WAS-4WMF]. 
61 Dmitry Namiot & Manfred Sneps-Sneppe, Geofence and Network Proximity, in 
INTERNET OF THINGS, SMART SPACES, AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS AND SYSTEMS: 
17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 117, 118 (Olga Galinina et al. eds., 2017). 
62 Cf. id. 
63 See generally TUROW, supra note 12. 
64 See generally FED. TRADE COMM., PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2016/privacy_and_data_security_update_2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E22Y-7AXK]. 
65 See, Stacey-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of 
Things, 59 B.C.L. REV. 423, 425–26 (2018). 
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vulnerable as a data set,” because you can’t “replace [it] like you can 
a credit card.”66 Additionally, biometric data is not subject to 
existing regulatory liabilities associated with using sensitive 
consumer financial information.67 The transfer of information 
between collecting companies and the compiling of user databases 
with aggregated profiles of consumers may compound the risks of 
sensitive information and creates an increased potential for 
substantial harm to consumers.68 While the collection of biometrics 
may provide new functions to business, it also presents privacy risks 
for consumers. Section I.B.1 outlines biometric privacy concerns 
involving locational data and surveillance, Section 1.B.2 discusses 
the privacy risks of data breaches, and Section I.B.3 discusses how 
aggregation by data brokers may compound privacy risks. 
1. Privacy and Surveillance 
Biometric data presents privacy risks due to its dual nature— as 
a digital record of automated and remote surveillance on one hand, 
and an irreplaceable and privately held password to consumers’ 
sensitive accounts on the other.69 
Biometrics, especially through facial recognition, are 
surveillance technologies—identifying and tracking individuals and 
collecting information about user’s lifestyles, habits, preferences, 
and associations.70 In Carpenter v. United States,71 the Supreme 
Court held that cell site location information (CSLI), automatically 
generated location information capable of tracking an individual 
when they used their cell phone, was protected private information 
as it “provide[d] an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing 
 
66 Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness 
Device, 72 J. MO. B. 76, 76 (2016). 
67 For example, the FTC has enforcement powers under the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6803, and FACT Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1616, when the information 
collector is a financial or credit reporting institution. 
68 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703, 1768–79 (2010). 
69 Ohm, supra note 8, at 1131. 
70 See, e.g., Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 
1591, 1593 (2017). 
71 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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not only [their] particular movements, but . . . familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”72 While Justice 
Roberts opinion does not directly implicate private actors,73 the 
collection of biometrics by private parties raises similar privacy 
concerns. 
Research suggests that Americans are increasingly sensitive 
about the data collected from them by private actors.74 A 2015 Pew 
Research Center study suggested that contrary to assertions that 
people increasingly “don’t care” about privacy,75 Americans value 
their personal information and freedom from surveillance in daily 
life.76 The study found that 63% of participants felt it is important to 
be able to “go around in public without always being identified.”77 
In an earlier study, Pew found that a majority—81%—of 
participants agreed that surveillance cameras are hard to avoid and 
that physical location over time was a sensitive category.78 These 
observations are coherent with a sense that the proliferation of 
 
72 Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
73 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
74 Vindu Goel, Survey Finds Americans Don’t Trust Government and Companies to 
Protect Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com
/2015/05/20/survey-finds-americans-dont-trust-government-and-companies-to-protect-
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/KX9S-5V47]. 
75 See generally Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act as if 
They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot
/americans-say-they-want-privacy-but-act-as-if-they-dont.html [https://perma.cc/494V-
CURB]. This phenomenon has been described in online behavior as the “privacy paradox” 
where users claim to be very concerned about their privacy yet undertake very few steps to 
protect their personal data. See generally Susanne Barth & Menno D.T. de Jong, The 
Privacy Paradox- Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and 
Actual Online Behavior – A Systematic Literature Review, 34 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 
1038 (2017). 
76 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Views About Data Collection and Security, 
PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-views-
about-data-collection-and-security/ [https://perma.cc/9LRA-3E95]. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (noting that many participants mentioned the presence of cameras of various kinds, 
stating, for example, that “CCTV [c]ameras are all over the place” and “[w]e are always 
on video. We leave [an] imprint as soon as we leave our house.”). 
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privacy-degrading devices leaves consumers uncomfortable and 
“fatigued,” but disempowered to meaningfully act in response.79 
Studies addressing consumer sentiments towards biometrics 
emphasize specific sensitivity to use of the technology in 
commercial settings.80 In a study by the Consumer Technology 
Association (CTA), consumers were less comfortable with 
biometric screening in malls and open public places than in areas 
like airports, which were perceived as more secure.81 The study 
found that the use of biometrics for commercial purposes produced 
the lowest comparative levels of comfort, with only 40% of 
participants being comfortable with its use.82 Additionally, the CTA 
study found that consumers trusted commercial organizations such 
as retail the least—15%—in terms of biometric information.83 The 
CTA study found that commercial consumers were more 
comfortable with some activities like authenticating transaction at 
retail stores, but were less so for commercial service personalization 
such as serving special offers in physical retail stores.84 Similarly, a 
2018 study by the Brookings Institutive found that 50% of 
participants found the use of facial recognition in retail settings to 
prevent theft unfavorable, with 42% of those surveyed stating that 
facial recognition was an invasion of personal privacy.85 Within 
 
79 In explaining the ‘‘privacy paradox,” Hargittai and Marwick emphasize pragmatism 
as a central component. This is the paradox that emerges from a prominent concern with 
privacy in the digital environment that is not manifested in actual online behavior. Focusing 
on young people in particular, they outline how people experience ‘‘privacy fatigue” and 
confusion about the data-driven systems in place, which leads to an acceptance of their 
data being collected as a pragmatic response in the negotiation with digital infrastructures 
and a sense of disempowerment to fundamentally challenge the nature of data collection. 
See Eszter Hargittai & Alice Marwick, What Can I Really Do? Explaining the Privacy 
Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 INT’L J. OF COMM’N 3737, 3738–41, 3752–53 (2016). 
80 See generally CONSUMER TECH. ASS’N, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES: UNDERSTANDING 
CONSUMER SENTIMENTS (2016). 
81 Id. at 16. 
82 Id. at 23. 
83 Id. at 53. 
84 Id. at 49. 
85 Darrell M. West, Brookings Survey Finds 50 Percent of People Are Unfavorable to 
Facial Recognition Software in Retail Stores to Prevent Theft, BROOKINGS (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/10/08/brookings-survey-finds-50-percent-
of-people-are-unfavorable-to-facial-recognition-software-in-retail-stores-to-prevent-theft/ 
[https://perma.cc/34N4-5C8A]. 
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identification, facial recognition is generally perceived as more 
concerning to privacy than other biometric techniques.86 In a 
University of Texas study, respondents most often ranked facial 
recognition as the biometric technique with which they were least 
comfortable.87 
Consumer mistrust and sensitivity towards surveillance 
techniques informs legal scholarship suggesting that the constant 
surveillance of individuals’ activities leads to privacy harms and the 
“chilling” of social interactions.88 Scholarship from social science 
research demonstrates that—when watched—individuals change 
their activities, avoiding “experiment[ing] with new, controversial, 
or deviant ideas.”89 Jonathan Penney has shown empirically that 
online surveillance causes “chilling,” where individuals self-censor, 
avoiding perceived risks about activities being leaked or disclosed 
where they would cause embarrassment or be used for nefarious 
purposes.90 Julie E. Cohen argues this effect homogenizes social 
interaction where the “pervasive monitoring of every first move or 
false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and 
the mainstream.”91 Daniel Solove has theorized that the monitoring-
induced mainstreaming of identity inhibits freedom of choice, 
resulting in pervasive forms of social control that are anti-
democratic.92 Joel Reidenberg emphasizes that anonymity in public 
is a critical feature for an open society, by protecting individuals 
from stalking and violence and enabling them to hold and advocate 
 
86 See generally Jamie Condliffe, Facial Recognition Is Getting Incredibly Powerful—
and Ever More Controversial, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2017, 10:16 AM), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/608832/facial-recognition-is-getting-
incredibly-powerful-and-ever-more-controversial/ [https://perma.cc/MZV9-K96G]. 
87 RACHEL L. GERMAN & K. SUZANNE BARBER, CONSUMER ATTITUDES ABOUT 
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION: A UT CID REPORT 7 (May 2018). 
88 See, e.g., Jonothan W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia 
Use, 31 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 117, 121–23 (2016). 
89 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 
(2013). 
90 Penney, supra note 88, at 126–27. 
91 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
92 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 494 (2006); 
see FOUCAULT, supra note 40, at 195–228 (theorizing that in a “panoptic society,” where 
individuals are under constant surveillance, the surveillance does not need to be “perfect” 
for individuals to behave as though they are under perfect surveillance). 
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unpopular ideas.93 These possible negative effects, while more 
problematic in governmental surveillance, are replicated in part 
through private sector surveillance.94 As a result, facial recognition 
may frustrate the ability to blend into the “obscurity” of a crowd, by 
lowering the transaction costs of finding and identifying people and 
ultimately restricting individuals expressive and social capacities.95 
While much scholarship has focused on direct governmental 
surveillance, the increasing scope of surveillance data collection 
from private actors implicates similar risks. Kiel Brennan-Marquez 
explains that existing voluntary data-sharing of surveillance 
material between private-sector actors and the government increases 
the potential of privacy harms.96 Private-sector actors already 
compile information on specific individuals’ locations and 
repackage it for police departments.97 Biometrics may increase the 
potential for harm as locational information is not limited to geo-
tags drawn from social media posts.98 Private actors’ direct access 
to increasingly large quantities of data on individuals’ informal data-
sharing, along with a lack of constraint by the constitutional 
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, may result in the 
amplification of harms.99 
2. Data Breach Risks 
Biometric information is based on a unique physiological 
characteristic making it naturally stable and hard to artificially 
alter.100 For this reasons device developers, app developers, and 
 
93 Joel Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 153 (2014). 
94 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1031 
(2014) (noting that coercive tendencies of private actors with a profit-maximizing motive 
is more acceptable than “the dangers that attend tyranny”). 
95 WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 234 (2018). Hartzog defines “obscurity” as “the state of 
information or people being hard or unlikely to be found or understood.” Id. 
96 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance, 66 KAN. L. 
REV. 485, 486, 488–89 (2018). 
97 Id. at 486. 
98 See id. 
99 Id. at 498. 
100 Margaret Rouse, Biometric Verification, TECHTARGET.COM (May, 2008), 
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometric-verification [https://perma.cc
/Z2UY-N6LZ]. 
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businesses are creating products which utilize this uniqueness of 
biometrics for password authentication, similar to the use of Social 
Security Numbers in the financial sector.101 The expanding 
collection of data increases the risk of data breaches, which have 
been ever increasing.102 Large biometric databases, including the 
fingerprint database of the Office of Personnel Management, have 
already been hacked.103 Other biometric databases such as those 
containing face-shape data are susceptible to hacking.104 Stolen 
biometric identifiers then can be used to impersonate consumers, 
gaining access to personal information.105 The use of biometrics for 
accessing sensitive personal information creates an increased risk of 
tangible and substantial harm if the information is stolen.106 
The privacy risks of data breach may lead to potential harms 
even where stolen consumer data is not used to directly harm 
 
101 See, e.g., Arielle Pardes, Facial Recognition Tech Is Ready for Its Post-Phone Future, 
WIRED (Sept. 10, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/future-of-facial-
recognition-technology/ [https://perma.cc/MW75-RS6T]; see also Ohm, supra note 8, at 
1144. 
102 See, e.g., KROLL, BUSINESSES REPORT ALL-TIME HIGH LEVELS OF FRAUD, CYBER, AND 
SECURITY INCIDENTS DURING 2017 (2018), https://www.kroll.com/-/media/kroll/pdfs
/news/business-report-fraud-cyber-and-security-incidents-2017.ashx?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/2G2U-SL5G]. 
103 See, e.g., Anish Malhotra, The World’s Largest Biometric ID System Keeps Getting 
Hacked: The Personal Data of Many Indians Is For Sale on WhatsApp For Less Than $10, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 8, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us
/article/43q4jp/aadhaar-hack-insecure-biometric-id-system [https://perma.cc/UPS9-
Z87U]; see also US Government Hack Stole Fingerprints of 5.6 Million Federal 
Employees, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015, 5:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/sep/23/us-government-hack-stole-fingerprints [https://perma.cc/2P5G-
KXWQ]. 
104 Kaveh Waddell, When Fingerprints Are as Easy to Steal as Passwords, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/new-
biometrics/520695/ [https://perma.cc/TL79-L4JF]. 
105 Id. But see Andy Greenberg, We Tried Really Hard To Beat Face ID—And Failed (So 
Far), WIRED (Nov. 3, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/tried-to-beat-face-id-
and-failed-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/29BQ-4CBA] (discussing how Wired magazine spent 
thousands of dollars on expensive masks and enlisted experienced biometric hackers in an 
attempt to trick Face ID following the release of the iPhone X, but still failed to beat the 
system). 
106 FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N8DJ-FNDL]. 
630         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
consumers. Daniel Solove and Danielle Citron theorize that 
consumers, anxious to the risks following a data breach, will act 
more cautiously as they become aware of the ongoing threats of their 
data in the possession of hackers.107 The heightened risk of harm 
following a data breach creates an additional harm in the form of a 
lost opportunity cost as individuals take actions to mitigate expected 
loss, resulting in “chilling a person’s ability to engage in life’s 
important activities.”108 
3. Big Data Aggregation and Algorithmic Bias 
Biometrics exists within a landscape of the large-scale creation, 
collection, and analysis of consumer data.109 2.5 quintillion bytes of 
data are created each day at our current pace, with 90% of the data 
in the world generated in the past two years.110 The dramatic 
increase in networked technologies combined with advancing trends 
in data analytics technology has opened the door to a new approach 
to understanding the world and making decisions—big data 
analysis.111 “Big data” are algorithmic information techniques that 
process large volume datasets and provide insights.112 Using 
predictive models, big data facilitates the analysis of large data sets 
and provides summaries that support consumer evidence-based 
decision-making, and captures nuanced pictures of consumers, 
which reveal “unexpected inferences about our habits, predilections, 
and personalities.”113 Shoshana Zuboff describes this process as 
“surveillance capitalism” where data extraction greatly diminishes 
 
107 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 759 (2018). 
108 Id. 
109 See, e.g., Madden & Rainie, supra note 76. 
110 Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats 
Everyone Should Read, FORBES, (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-
blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/#469bbaaa60ba [https://perma.cc/VT7N-DNLW]. 
111 Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html 
[https://perma.cc/EW4B-M323]. 
112 Amir Gandomi & Murtaza Haider, Beyond the Hype: Big Data Concepts, Methods, 
and Analytics, 35 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 137, 140 (2015). 
113 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90 (2014). 
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the information costs of corporate actors, redistributing privacy 
rights away from consumers and towards corporate actors.114 
Consumer behavioral insights are a valuable commodity across 
various business sectors including marketing and ecommerce.115 As 
a result, big data analysis has become an industry worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars.116 In the present data economy, consumer data is 
routinely shared, sold, or made available to third parties.117 The 
ecosystem of big data analysis is served by data brokers—third 
parties that aggregate consumer information across sources and use 
it to create highly detailed profiles about individuals.118 One of the 
largest data brokers, Acxiom reportedly has 1500 data points on 
over 700 million individuals.119 Data brokers do not have a direct 
relationship with the individuals they are collecting data on, and 
individuals are often unaware that their information is being 
transferred, shared, or sold to third parties.120 This process occurs in 
a landscape with almost no restrictions on the transferal of 
information collected by a first party to third party actors, with 
consumers having no way of identifying which parties hold their 
information.121 
 
114 Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an 
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 83 (2015). 
115 Alex Romanov, Putting a Dollar Value on Data Insights, WIRED, 
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/07/putting-a-dollar-value-on-big-data-insights/ 
[https://perma.cc/M32R-2G7Z] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (noting that Walmart was able 
to use big data analysis to drive a 10–15% increase in completed online sales for $1 billion 
in incremental revenue). 
116 Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), https://www.economist.com
/special-report/2010/02/25/data-data-everywhere [https://perma.cc/V89V-UZ6P]. 
117 Id. 
118 See Julie Brill, Demanding Transparency from Data Brokers, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/demanding-transparency-from-data-
brokers/2013/08/15/00609680-0382-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/37TX-2SRL]. 
119 Id. 
120 Yael Grauer, What Are “Data Brokers,” and Why Are They Scooping Up Information 
About You?, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-how-to-stop-my-
private-data-collection [https://perma.cc/59TR-XGJN]. 
121 Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party 
Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 337 (2013). 
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Biometrics are a potential solution to an industry issue of “data 
[being] worthless in a vacuum.”122 Insights from data may only be 
extracted where data is structured,123 allowing analytic processes to 
turn the high volume of “meaningless” raw data into “meaningful 
insights.”124 Some data, like purchase records, may be collected in 
structured form. By one estimation structured data accounts for only 
5% of all existing collected data.125 Large quantities of data 
collected in formats such as video, image, and audio, on the other 
hand, cannot be leveraged for insights without an intermediate 
process to structure the data.126 Facial recognition, when used as a 
unique persistent identifier in a data management system, enables 
organizations to structure previously unstructured video data, 
associating an identity with other raw data such as previous 
purchases, emotional response, age, gender, and in-store movement 
patterns, and increasing the value of the customer profile.127 When 
analyzing consumer decision-making, consumer engagement that 
does not result in a conversion or purchase may be as significant as 
those transactions that are recorded in financial data.128 Biometric 
identification techniques, when shared across data collectors, then 
dramatically expand the sources from which consumer data may be 
drawn, increasing the accuracy and invasiveness of aggregate 
profile creation. 
The effects of biometric data’s utility—identifying specific 
individuals—compound privacy risks from data aggregation. 
Consumer profiles assembled using biometrics are more valuable to 
data brokers as they provide greater profile accuracy.129 In a 
 
122 Gandomi & Haider, supra note 112, at 140. 
123 Structured data, unlike unstructured data, has predefined metadata and can be stored 
in relational databases making it searchable by human or algorithm. 
124 Gandomi & Haider, supra note 112, at 140. 
125 Id. at 138. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Sam Ransbotham & David Kiron, Using Analytics To Improve Customer 
Engagement, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu
/projects/using-analytics-to-improve-customer-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/4YLL-
DLJ7]. 
129 See MCKINSEY, THE AGE OF ANALYTICS COMPETING IN A DATA-DRIVEN WORLD 65 
(2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions
/McKinsey%20Analytics/Our%20Insights/The%20age%20of%20analytics%20Competin
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marketplace where aggregate consumer data often contains 
incorrect and erroneous information,130 increasing the accuracy of 
information is highly lucrative for data brokers.131 More accurate 
data allows for higher confidence in insights, which allows for a 
competitive advantage to the data’s users in predicting consumer’s 
actions. 
The wide availability of facial biometric identity allows 
corporations to use previously unstructured locational and choice-
based data to tailor marketing based on the specific identity, 
compounding the invasive harmful effects of behavioral 
marketing.132 As Ryan Calo has observed, increased accuracy of 
personal information profiles can allow for “digital market 
manipulation” by being leveraged for the “mass production of bias,” 
“disclosure ratcheting,” and “means-based targeting.”133 Calo 
explores how big data analysis, using insights derived from 
behavioral economics, permits firms to delineate the specific ways 
each individual consumer “deviates from rational decisionmaking, 
however idiosyncratic, and leverage that bias to the firm’s 
advantage.”134 Calo identifies the economic and privacy costs from 
digital market manipulation.135 The technique results in increased 
transaction costs when “consumer[s] spend time and money hiding 
their identity or browsing the same website at different times or with 
different browsers in order to compare price or even to avoid creepy 
ads.”136 Simultaneously, “the unanticipated or coerced use of 
 
g%20in%20a%20data%20driven%20world/MGI-The-Age-of-Analytics-Full-report.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/9N54-YAQ9]. 
130 Melanie Hicken, Find Out What Big Data Knows About You (It May Be Very Wrong), 
CNN: MONEY (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:02 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/pf/acxiom-
consumer-data/ [https://perma.cc/9N7Q-PDUZ]. 
131 Facial Recognition Market is Expected to Reach $9.6 Billion, Worldwide by 2022, 
CISION: PRNEWSWIRE (June 29, 2016), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/facial-
recognition-market-is-expected-to-reach-96-billion-worldwide-by-2022-584841741.html 
[https://perma.cc/6YK3-RJY4]. 
132 Ashley Deeks & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Facial Recognition Software: Costs and 
Benefits, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-
recognition-software-costs-and-benefits [https://perma.cc/6NJX-D8L6]. 
133 See Calo, supra note 94, at 995–96. 
134 Id. at 1003. 
135 Id. at 1027. 
136 Id. 
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personal information” may disadvantage individuals through rent 
extraction, such as raising prices for those who visit a product page 
multiple times.137  
Citron and Pasquale have further noted that analysis of data to 
create individuals’ scores may be harmful by “turn[ing] individuals 
into ranked and rated objects” that control individuals opportunities 
but may be based in inaccurate information or algorithmic bias with 
little transparency or input by scored parties.138 Additional risks 
occur where bias inherent to algorithms results in replicating “cross-
race effect[s],” where historically disenfranchised groups are 
disproportionally misidentified.139 This outcome can result in 
replication of discriminatory practices, such as misidentifying 
individuals as shoplifters in a retail setting.140 Where privacy is at 
risk from the types, use, and quantity of information collected, the 
effects of facial recognition in this data environment require more 
precise analysis. 
C. Biometrics in Retail 
Facial recognition is a rapidly growing biometric technology 
used in the retail sector.141 A recent study found that facial 
recognition is likely to generate revenue of $9.78 billion by 2023, 
growing at a compounded annual growth rate of 16.81% between 
2017 and 2023.142 The market for facial recognition is increasing, 
with large investments of up to $1.6 billion in start-ups from China, 
a country that has been an open environment for testing the 
 
137 Id. at 1029–30. 
138 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2014). 
139 Rod McCullom, Facial Recognition Is Both Biased and Understudied, UNDARK (May 
17, 2017), https://undark.org/article/facial-recognition-technology-biased-understudied/ 
[https://perma.cc/3WGM-29PC]; see also Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If 
You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html 
[https://perma.cc/7LM2-NRQG] (noting that each company’s error rates were significantly 
higher for non-white non-male individuals). 
140 McCullom, supra note 138. 
141 Lieber, supra note 7. 
142 Global Facial Recognition Market Report 2018, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (June 5, 
2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-facial-recognition-market-
report-2018-300660163.html [https://perma.cc/24AT-F9ST]. 
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technology.143 Intel, and Chinese internet company Tencent, have 
announced a collaboration on products that use AI and facial 
recognition to “gain new insights about their customers to both 
elevate the users’ experience and drive business transformation.”144 
Decreases in the associated costs of the technology have made facial 
recognition software a viable tool for retailers.145 Services such as 
FaceFirst offer facial recognition specifically targeted to retailers 
using “surveillance . . . and an underlying software platform that 
leverages artificial intelligence to [prevent] theft, [fraud,] . . . 
and . . . violence.”146 Additionally, facial recognition can be used by 
retailers to connect online with offline behaviors, provide more in-
depth demographics, and track in-store product engagement.147 This 
Section discusses the specific uses of facial recognition technologies 
in the retail sector and the potential legal questions that arise from 
data collection, use, and sharing. 
The idea of retailers tracking customers is not new.148 Neither is 
the premise of using images of customers to provide personalized 
 
143 Jamie Condliffe, Big Investors are Placing Bets on China’s Facial Recognition Start-
Ups, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/business/dealbook
/china-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/A6NN-B2JS]; see also Rachel Change, 
China is the World’s Retail Laboratory, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 18, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-18/china-is-the-world-s-retail-
laboratory [https://perma.cc/7GTV-VLLC]. 
144 Jonathan Chadwick, Tencent Teams Up with Intel for Retail Surveillance Camera and 
“AI Box,” COMPUTER BUS. REV. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.cbronline.com/news/ai-box 
[https://perma.cc/5DUX-BZMA]; see also Ashley Armstrong, Chinese Online Retailer JD 
Plans to Open Hundreds of Unmanned Shops, Ahead of Amazon, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 14, 
2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/12/14/chinese-online-
retailer-jd-plans-open-hundreds-unmanned-shops/. 
145 Nick Coult, Facial Recognition Software: Coming Soon to Your Local Retailer?, 
CRIME REP. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/04/23/facial-recognition-
software-coming-soon-to-your-local-retailer [https://perma.cc/9C9A-TPQA]. 
146 FaceFirst Launches Fraud-IQ to Solve $9.6B Retail Return Fraud Problem with 
Facial Recognition, CISION: PRWEB (June 11, 2018), https://www.prweb.com/releases
/2018/06/prweb15550963.html [https://perma.cc/NE4U-7MBJ]. 
147 Bryan Pearson, 3 Ways Retailers Can Use Facial Recognition To Create Better 
Experiences, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bryanpearson/2018/03/15/3-ways-retailers-can-use-facial-recognition-to-express-better-
experiences/#4e87d12c1766 [https://perma.cc/DKP3-K2HR]. 
148 See TUROW, supra note 12, at 87 (discussing the use of reward cards to track specific 
customers purchases and send unique promotions). Building customer loyalty through 
memory of specific clients and shaping a retail experience to their habits and needs are at 
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white glove service.149 A central premise in the historical 
development of retail has been providing “personalized service” and 
creating customer loyalty.150 What is new is the expanded accuracy 
and range of collection beyond a point of sale or loyalty programs.151 
“True personalization,” through individual-level relevance has been 
the most difficult marketing tactic, because it requires both 
responsiveness and highly accurate data, which is difficult to collect, 
analyze, and apply to messages in real time.152 Facial recognition 
may allow for other consumer benefits including an enhanced 
customer service experience,153 greater operational efficiency,154 
better advertising quality,155 and most importantly convenience.156 
Additionally, facial recognition may allow for greater competition 
 
the root of what is considered good customer service. See Leigh Buchanan, A Customer 
Service Makeover, INC. (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.inc.com/magazine/20110301/a-
customer-service-makeover_pagen_2.html [https://perma.cc/E5YG-75EC]. 
149 See, e.g., Drew Limsky, Business Travel; Hotels Are Doing Business on a Last-Name 
Basis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/01/business/business
-travel-hotels-are-doing-business-on-a-last-name-basis.html [https://perma.cc/7GDH-
4C3Z] (discussing upscale hotel chains’ guest recognition programs where “photographs 
of V.I.P.’s are distributed by e-mail to the hotel staff” emphasizing personalized service 
and identity recognition); see also Julie Weed, Checking in After Checkout, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/business/hotels-work-harder-to-
collect-customer-responses.html [https://perma.cc/KPL8-4SV3] (describing the use of 
internal customer feedback to tailor service to the specific customer). 
150 See TUROW, supra note 12, at 29–30 (discussing early twentieth century retailers trust-
based relationships with consumers and the ability to recognize patterns of transactions). 
151 Id. at 3. 
152 Id. at 186. 
153 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, Walmart Is Developing a Robot That Identifies Unhappy 
Shoppers, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/walmart-is-developing-a-robot-that-identifies-unhappy-shoppers-2017-7 
[https://perma.cc/NLS7-H2WS]. 
154 See, e.g., Annie Lin, Facial Recognition Is Tracking Customers as They Shop in 
Stores, Tech Company Says, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2017, 11:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2017/11/23/facial-recognition-is-tracking-customers-as-they-shop-in-stores-tech-
company-says.html [https://perma.cc/8P3Y-4A2C]. 
155 See, e.g., MARK BARTHOLOMEW, ADCREEP: THE CASE AGAINST MODERN MARKETING 
73 (2017). 
156 See, e.g., Will Knight, Paying with Your Face, MIT TECH. REV., https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/603494/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-paying-with-
your-face/ [https://perma.cc/P3SS-SXSC] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); see also Andrea 
Felsted, From Amazon to Alibaba Grocers’ Agony Is Endless, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2018, 
1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-08-06/from-amazon-to-
alibaba-grocers-agony-is-endless [https://perma.cc/2EYH-S74H]. 
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in the “war” between brick-and-mortar retailers and ecommerce 
retailers like Amazon.157 Out of a need to compete for consumers, 
stores are becoming physical websites, as retailers invest in in-store 
technologies that can replicate the types of information collected by 
cookies and other markers online.158 The goal is to exceed the types 
and quantity of information collected online, providing a 
competitive advantage for retailers that maintain physical 
presences.159 This strategy is described in the industry as 
“omnichannel,” where a physical retailer can meld various points of 
information from online and mobile phone capabilities with its 
physical resources.160 Facial recognition can be incorporated into 
omnichannel as a persistent identifier.161 This can solve an existing 
issue of “identity resolution,” which requires retailers to connect 
customers’ many identifiers across channels (like email addresses, 
cookies, phone numbers, mobile device ad IDs and home addresses) 
 
157 See TUROW, supra note 13, at 142 (discussing the use of reward cards to track specific 
customers purchases and send unique promotions). This creates a situation in which 
retailors must adapt to new expectations and pressures of consumers or face failure. See 
Matt Townsend et al., America’s “Retail Apocalypse” Is Really Just Beginning, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-retail-debt/ 
[https://perma.cc/8N9S-Q64X]. 
158 See TUROW, supra note 12, at 107–43. Retailers have adopted technologies for 
monitoring customers in stores and constructing unique shopper profiles which combine 
social characteristics, behaviors, and engagement with products to increase the likelihood 
of conversion—a sale or other desired action. Id. at 148–50. 
159 See Marc Vermut, Why Omnichannel Is the Future of Retail for Millennials (and 
Everyone Else, Too), ADAGE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://adage.com/article/neustar
/omnichannel-future-retail-millennials/315054/ [https://perma.cc/5AYG-BDST] 
(describing in a “publishing partner” article, in coordination with marketing intelligence 
brand Neustar, the potential of omnichannel to build a competitive advantage using data 
analytics gathered from various sources); see also Eric Nyquist, How to Make the Most of 
Omnichannel Retailing, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2016/07/how-to-make-the-most-
of-omnichannel-retailing [https://perma.cc/3259-CYTM] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018) (“The 
more profitable play is to coax online shoppers to come into your stores, where the 
environment can induce them to spend more.”). 
160 TUROW, supra note 12, at 108; see also Michael Corkery, Hard Lessons (Thanks 
Amazon) Breathe New Life into Retail Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/business/retail-walmart-amazon-economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/8RDN-TV3U]. 
161 See Peter Messmer, Why Is Identity Resolution so Valuable for Retailers with Physical 
Locations?, ADDSHOPPERS (July 9, 2018), https://www.addshoppers.com/blog/why-is-
identity-resolution-so-valuable-for-retailers-with-physical-locations 
[https://perma.cc/RF9P-JXWV]. 
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into a single useful customer profile.162 Efficiently solving issues of 
identity resolution efficiently is seen as a lucrative goal of various 
marketing services companies aimed at customizing customer 
interactions on a micro-level.163 
Facial recognition is viewed as an important tool in the toolbox 
of “the future of shopping,” with retailers already experimenting 
with its potential.164 In 2015, Walmart tested a system that scanned 
the faces of all individuals entering several of its stores; the system 
could identify suspected shoplifters, and instantly alerted store 
security on their mobile devices.165 Use of facial recognition is not 
limited to large national retailers, however.166 In March of 2018, the 
ACLU reached out to twenty of the biggest stores in the United 
States to ask if they use facial recognition technology: the resulting 
report stated that “of the 20 companies . . . contacted, only one was 
willing to tell [the ACLU] that they don’t use it.”167 
Many facial recognition products presently on the market focus 
on increasing security through automated facial recognition 
technology.168 However, as some independent experts have noted, 
the technology may be less effective as a security measure for 
private businesses because they lack access to databases held by law 
enforcement agencies.169 Rather, customer engagement and 
 
162 Id. 
163 See generally SIGNAL, THE FUTURE OF RETAIL: IDENTITY IS THE NEXT COMPETITIVE 
BATTLEGROUND (2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/370829/ABM%20Retail%20Q2
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164 TUROW, supra note 12, at 227. 
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Customers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/sports
/facial-recognition-madison-square-garden.html [https://perma.cc/5A4A-LRBU]. 
169 Chris Frey, Revealed: How Facial Recognition Has Invaded Shops—and Your 
Privacy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/mar/03
/revealed-facial-recognition-software-infiltrating-cities-saks-toronto 
[https://perma.cc/L48S-ETEF]. 
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marketing capabilities of facial recognition are the projected 
valuable commodity for retailers.170 Facial recognition as part of an 
omnichannel approach can track “all those aggregated bits of data 
collected through loyalty programs, point of sale records and other 
sources.”171 
Various products and services already exist in the market 
offering the utility of facial recognition to retailers.172 FaceFirst, 
which is a major player in the field, offers a product and application 
programming interface (API) plug-in that allows for integrating face 
recognition into “virtually any third-party software.”173 Peter Trepp, 
the CEO of FaceFirst, told BuzzFeed News that “hundreds of [retail] 
locations, growing to thousands very soon” were incorporating the 
company’s facial recognition system.174 FaceFirst’s software is 
designed to scan faces from a distance of fifty to one hundred feet.175 
As consumers enter a store, a CCTV camera captures multiple 
images of each shopper.176 The software then analyzes that image 
and compares it to a database of “dishonest customers” provided by 
retailers or third-parties.177 Other software developers have created 
technology allowing retailers to match consumer facial scans with a 
database of “valued customers,” identifying their shopping 
profile.178 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id.; see also Sapna Maheshwari, Stores See a Future Without “May I Help You?” 
(They’ll Already Have Your Data), N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/03/10/business/retail-stores-technology.html [https://perma.cc/Z8BF-PBN6] 
(discussing that through facial recognition “stores could send automatic text messages and 
receive theirs profiles to assist them better[,]” allowing stores to “immediately know 
customers’ identities and personal preferences when they arrived”). 
172 See, e.g., Company Overview, FACEFIRST, https://www.facefirst.com/ [https://
perma.cc/GP2Y-HEZ5] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). 
173 Sentinel-IQ Face Recognition Surveillance, FACEFIRST, https://www.facefirst.com
/solutions/surveillance-face-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/3JUS-8WHJ] (last visited Sept. 
18, 2018). 
174 Leticia Miranda, Thousands of Stores Will Soon Use Facial Recognition, and They 
Don’t Need Your Consent, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 17, 2018, 10:28 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/retail-companies-are-testing-out-
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Legal questions arise from the divergence of customers’ 
expectations and the extent of information made available for 
collection and use through biometric facial recognition. Legal 
scholars have argued that there is no privacy in public,179 and CCTV 
has been found not to violate any traditional privacy torts.180 Many 
places that appear public, like retail establishments, are in fact 
privately owned, making visual surveillance difficult to avoid.181 
Private areas are often surveilled and it is difficult to argue that a 
face is truly private.182 Even if consumers assume they will be under 
some form of video surveillance, facial recognition likely exceeds 
their expectations that store camera feeds are not actively monitored, 
and that if monitored, that the video footage is not used unless an 
altercation of some kind occurs.183 Although biometric collection 
may enable new functionalities for retailers, the prospect of data 
being used for divergent purposes such as being shared or sold raises 
important legal questions.184 It also exposes consumers to targeted 
advertising, by their faceprint being captured, retained, connected to 
their real-world identity, and combined with information about their 
income, education, demographics, and other data. 
Biometric data collected and used by retailers presents unique 
problems to regulation. A consumer leaving his or her home and 
entering a brick-and-mortar retailer may be identified. The 
consumer may not even see the camera that captures their faceprint. 
He or she is likely unaware that their collected data is subject to the 
risk of breach or that their habits or demographics may be employed 
to deliver hyper-targeted advertising. There is little opportunity to 
clearly notify consumers and less to obtain consent, written or 
otherwise. Facial recognition facilitates and furthers the reach of a 
“collection imperative,” extending and connecting the constant 
 
179 See, e.g., Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic 
Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544 (2012). 
180 See Robert D. Bickel, Susan Brinkley & Wendy White, Seeing Past Privacy: Will the 
Development and Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology Compromise 
an Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy or Will Courts Strike a Proper Balance?, 
33 STETSON L. REV. 299, 342–43 (2003). 
181 COHEN, supra note 36, at 165–66. 
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surveillance of networked devices to “real” space while increasing 
the value of the data collected.185 The disproportionate power over 
information by private entities increases the potential for abuse. For 
this reason, legal scholars have called for an outright ban on the 
technology.186 Consideration of these legal questions requires an 
understanding of how the United States addresses issues of 
consumer data privacy. The next Part discusses the current approach 
to consumer data privacy in the United States. 
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORDERING 
This Part explores present federal, state, and private sector 
approaches to privacy protections for consumer biometric 
information collected in commercial settings. Section II.A discusses 
existing state privacy statutes that recognize individual-rights in 
facial recognition information as well as recent litigation trends. 
Section II.B describes the sectoral approach to federal privacy 
statutes and the absence of individual rights at the federal level. 
Section II.C then explain a managerial approach through the FTC’s 
authority under Section 5 to take enforcement action against 
companies that engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices and the 
goals of facilitating self-regulation. Finally, Section II.D describes a 
multi-stakeholder approach employed by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to 
develop industry-wide facial recognition standards. 
A. State Legislation 
At the state level, there is some movement towards regulating 
biometric data, including facial recognition. States have followed 
differing strategies in addressing the issues of biometric data. 
Connecticut, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming have included biometric information in their statutory 
definitions of “personal information” in data security breach 
 
185 See Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy, 98 B.U.L. REV. 1139, 
1141 (2018); See also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 87 
(2019) (discussing a similar notion of the “extraction imperative”). 
186 Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 10. 
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notification laws.187 Other states, including New York, Connecticut, 
and Alaska, have proposed legislation seeking to regulate biometric 
data, but have yet to enact legislation.188 
Only three states have enacted statutes directly governing 
biometric information privacy.189 In 2009, Texas enacted a statute 
governing biometric information: the “Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier” (CUBI).190 CUBI permits collection of biometrics for a 
commercial purpose based on informed consent, as well as for the 
sale or disclosure of biometric data under certain limited 
circumstances.191 CUBI does not provide a private right of action, 
but the Texas Attorney General can bring an action to recover 
against a company for up to $25,000 per violation.192 
In 2017, Washington enacted legislation applicable to 
biometrics.193 The Washington law includes a broad definition of 
biometric identifiers, including any “data generated by automatic 
measurements of an individual’s biological characteristics . . . that 
is used to identify a specific individual.”194 Companies are required 
to provide notice of collection for a commercial purpose, and, to 
obtain consent.195 The law’s text states that consent is “context-
dependent.”196 The Washington and Texas laws, while generating 
 
187 See Daveante Jones, Protecting Biometric Information in Arkansas, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
117, 132 (2016) (quoting Phil Ross, Biometrics: A Developing Regulatory Landscape for 
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(replicating the language of Illinois BIPA); H.B. 5522, 2017 Leg. (Conn. 2017) 
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new corporate compliance objects, have been described as 
“lack[ing] teeth,” as they do not include a private right of action and 
have not resulted in enforcement by attorneys general.197 
The main source of recent biometrics lawsuits is the Illinois 
Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008 (BIPA).198 While BIPA 
was enacted over ten years ago, over the past two years there has 
been a marked increase in the quantity of BIPA lawsuits, with 
plaintiffs suing more than thirty companies across a range of 
industries, including large tech companies Google and Facebook, 
for alleged violations.199 BIPA regulates the collection, use, and 
storage of biometric information by private entities, covering 
“biometric identifiers”—including “face geometry”—which covers 
information created through the facial recognition process.200 Under 
BIPA, before collecting biometric information, any private entity 
must provide the individual with notice that the information is being 
collected, including the duration of the period for which the 
information will stored, and used; the individual must also consent 
through a written release.201 Biometric information must be 
destroyed when the initial purpose for collecting the information has 
been satisfied, or within three years of the individual’s last 
interaction with the private entity.202 
BIPA, like the Washington and Texas laws, relies on a notice-
and-choice framework.203 This approach originates from FTC 
privacy policy guidance.204 Notice requires that consumers be given 
“clear and conspicuous notice of an entity’s information before any 
personal information is collected from them.”205 Choice requires 
 
197 Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin, 
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Choice Framework, 11 J.L. INFO. POL’Y 485, 489 (2015). 
205 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov
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“giving consumers options as to how any personal information 
collected from them may be used . . . beyond those necessary to 
complete a contemplated transaction.”206 As discussed infra, there is 
debate among scholars as to whether this approach is workable.207 
Under BIPA, failure to provide notice-and-choice can subject a 
company to a private right of action, with recovery of up to the 
greater of actual damages or $5,000 per reckless violation.208 Private 
litigants can also recover attorney fees, costs (including expert fees 
and litigation expenses), and additional relief at the discretion of the 
court.209 Negligent violations of the statute permit recovery of the 
greater of actual damages or $1,000 per violation.210 BIPA sets a 
high standard for corporate compliance, with the requirement for 
written consent having been described as “really, really 
burdensome.”211 This, however, has not limited plaintiffs from 
bringing suit alleging violations of BIPA. 
Most suits have focused on BIPA’s notice-and-consent 
requirement.212 The main hurdle for the sustainability of lawsuits 
under BIPA has been alleging harm to confer standing following 
Spokeo v. Robbins,213 which requires a plaintiff to allege an injury-
in-fact that is both concrete and particularized.214 In a class action 
suit, the plaintiffs in Patel v. Facebook,215 alleged that Facebook 
unlawfully collected and stored biometric data derived from their 
faces. A district court in California found that a state statute could 
establish standing in federal court for an alleged privacy harm.216 
 
/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YP2R-9PZS]. 
206 Id. at 15. 
207 See generally Reidenberg, supra note 203. 
208 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008). 
209 Id. 
210 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(1). 
211 Shukovsky, supra note 196. 
212 See, e.g., Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment, 2017 WL 6523910, at *7 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2017). 
213 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
214 For a discussion of the implications of Spokeo for alleging privacy harms see Mathew 
DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2439 (2018). 
215 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (cases consolidated at In re Facebook 
Biometric Information Privacy Litig., No. 15-03747 (N.D. Cal. 2018)). 
216 Id. at 953. 
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The court found that “provisions [of BIPA], along with the plain text 
of BIPA as a whole, leave little question that the Illinois legislature 
codified a right of privacy in personal biometric information.”217 
However, cases in Illinois federal court have found plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate “concrete injuries” that violated a statutory right.218 
The fate of recent BIPA cases is yet to be determined.219 The 
still-pending lawsuits demonstrate the possible implications of a 
verdict, specifically for Facebook, which could lead to damages in 
the billions of dollars.220 Finding liability for companies like 
Facebook under BIPA would shift the trend away from unsuccessful 
consumer lawsuits against large corporations for privacy related 
activities that do not include data breach.221 Additionally, various 
states with proposed BIPA-style private action legislation will be 
interested in the outcome.222 The effects of a verdict against 
 
217 Id.  This interpretation was affirmed at the state level by the Illinois Supreme Court 
in Rosenbach v. Six Flags, 2019 IL 123186 (2019). 
218 See, e.g., Matthew Boesler, Google Wins Dismissal of Suit Over Facial Recognition 
Software, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2018-12-29/google-wins-dismissal-of-suit-over-facial-recognition-
software-jq9w1mws [https://perma.cc/FJN9-C68F]. 
219 The status of challenges to standing under BIPA have been complicated by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois in Rosenbach v. Six Flags, 2019 IL 123186 (2019) finding that 
the construction and “unambiguous” language of the statute confer standing to sue in the 
absence of a breach in contradiction of Illinois federal courts interpretations of the 
requirements of Spokeo. See, e.g., McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage, Inc., No. 17 C 
08054, 2019 WL 95154, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2019). 
220 Joel Rosenblatt, Facebook Photo-Scanning Suit Is a Multibillion-Dollar Threat, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2018, 10:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
04-16/facebook-must-face-group-suit-claiming-it-stole-biometric-data 
[https://perma.cc/T9DP-76N4]. 
221 See, e.g., Joel Rosenblatt, Facebook Users Can’t Sue as a Group Over Advertisers’ 
Data Use, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2016, 9:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2016-09-02/facebook-users-ruled-too-varied-to-pursue-group-privacy-
lawsuit [https://perma.cc/MW55-Z3GR]. 
222 Torsten M. Kracht et al., Biometric Information Protection: The Stage Is Set for 
Expansion of Claims, LEXIS NEXIS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-
practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2018/02/28/biometric-information-protection-
the-stage-is-set-for-expansion-of-claims.aspx [https://perma.cc/2WL4-LYKW] (noting 
that Michigan, New Hampshire, Alaska, and Montana have proposed biometric legislation 
that includes a private right of action for violations). Additionally, California passed a 
sweeping consumer privacy law with the potential to rework compliance regimes across a 
variety of sectors including retail use of biometrics. Dipayan Ghosh, What You Need to 
Know About California’s New Data Privacy Law, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2018), 
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Facebook could be dramatic, “caus[ing] other companies to think 
they could be subject to [] massive damages.”223 Similarly, class 
action plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to ramp up BIPA related 
litigation as more companies begin to use the technology.224 This 
may serve as a significant financial incentive to compliance with 
biometric statutes, or discontinuance of the technique altogether.225 
As this Note discusses below, regulation that functionally prevents 
use of a technology removes any consumer choice and may be 
disproportionate to the privacy harm of the regulated activity.226 
Present state law, while trending towards the inclusion of some 
protections of biometric data, has not yet defined a clear set of 
practical norms or expressed a preference for private litigation or 
public enforcement. 
B. Federal Legislation 
Federal privacy law in the United States follows a sectoral 
approach, where a patchwork of statutes regulate different industries 
and economic sectors.227 This approach differs from many other 
industrialized nations, where a centralized “omnibus” statute 
protects all personal data.228 Under federal law, statutes differentiate 
between specific types of data and the context of that data’s 
collection or use.229 For example, financial data is regulated through 
 
https://hbr.org/2018/07/what-you-need-to-know-about-californias-new-data-privacy-law 
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224 Steven Grimes & Eric Shinabarger, Biometric Privacy Litigation: The Next Class 
Action Battleground, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://biglawbusiness.com/biometric-privacy-litigation-the-next-class-action-
battleground/ [https://perma.cc/X5B9-XX6C]. 
225 Cf. Ally Marotti, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t in Illinois. Here’s Why, CHICAGO TRIB. 
(Jan. 17, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-google-art-
selfies-20180116-story.html [https://perma.cc/AA2N-6HA2] (discussing how Google 
does not offer specific features and products in Illinois in response to the requirements and 
litigation risk of BIPA). 
226 See also id. 
227 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014). 
228 Id. 
229 See id. (“There is a law for video records and a different law for cable records.”). 
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the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which protects the privacy 
of credit information and prescribes reporting requirements for 
credit companies,230 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 
which applies to companies that provide financial products.231 
Different laws regulate medical information, such the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),232 which 
protects the privacy of health data. 
The sectoral approach leaves large areas unregulated, with no 
federal law that directly protects the privacy of data collected by 
retailers such as Macy’s or Amazon.233 As a result, there is no 
federal statute that specifically regulates biometrics in the private 
sector.234 In the absence of a federal statute regulating the general 
collection of consumer data, the large quantities of data collected by 
biometric facial recognition will be addressed at the state level or 
through regulatory agencies.235 The apparent downside of the 
sectoral approach, as opposed to an omnibus approach, is that the 
regulations are context-specific and may not address specific types 
of data such as biometrics.236 The sectoral approach may be 
advantageous, however, as it avoids federal preemption, 
incentivizes narrowly tailored legislative strategies, and allows for 
organic development of regulatory tactics for emerging 
technologies.237 
C. Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has played a central role 
in regulating consumer data.238 In 1914, Congress created the FTC 
through the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) to protect 
 
230 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
231 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09, 6821–27. 
232 Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
233 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 226, at 587. 
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consumers and promote competition.239 Section 5 of the FTCA 
authorizes the FTC to identify, and enforce against, “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” that affect commerce.240 In the absence 
of a federal law that directly protects the privacy of biometric data 
collected and used by retailers the FTC may regulate under its 
Section 5 authority.241 
The FTC has largely focused its approach to privacy interests on 
its “deceptiveness authority,” bringing actions against companies 
found to mislead consumers on control or collection of user data.242 
The FTC may regulate retailers based on representations in their 
privacy policies. However, this approach is of limited utility for 
biometrics in retail settings as the FTC cannot mandate that 
companies have privacy policies, privacy policies have inherent 
incentives for vagueness, and biometric collection and use is remote 
and often facilitated by third parties with no direct relationship with 
consumers. Where companies do not make privacy policy 
misrepresentations, the FTC may bring regulatory adjudication 
under its “unfairness” jurisdiction. 
Under the FTCA, the FTC can declare an act or practice to be 
“unfair” if it: (1) “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
customers;” (2) the injury “is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves;” and (3) the injury is “not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.”243 
Additionally, Section 45(n) clarifies that “the [FTC] may consider 
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all 
other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as 
a primary basis for such determination.”244 The FTC’s policy 
statement on unfair practices suggests that the extent to which a 
 
239 Id. at 598. 
240 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT SECTION 5: UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR 
PRACTICES, FED. RESERVE (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual
/cch/ftca.pdf [https://perma.cc/6948-RL96]. 
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242 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Approves Final Order in 
Nomi Technologies Case (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases
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RSYL]. 
243 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), (n) (2012). 
244 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
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practice violates recognized public policy, is “unethical or 
unscrupulous,” as well as whether consumers suffer substantial 
injury that is not “outweighed by any offsetting consumer or 
competitive benefits” and “which consumers could not reasonably 
have avoided” are all relevant in assessing the unfairness of a 
practice.245 The FTC has stated that “[a]n injury may be sufficiently 
substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of people, 
or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”246 
The FTC has limited substantive Magnuson-Moss rulemaking 
authority under the FTCA, however, the restrictive procedural 
requirements of this approach make it functionally ineffective.247 
Courts have recognized that the FTC may use adjudication for 
regulating activities that relate to privacy.248 With the emergence of 
internet commerce and new networked technologies, the FTC’s 
main role has been as a “backstop” to industry promulgated self-
regulatory regimes.249 The FTC’s actions in the privacy space have 
been constrained, bringing only cases with a high likelihood of 
success, and settling the vast majority of cases.250 Hartzog and 
Solove argue that the FTC therefore essentially acts as a norm 
setting body, incrementally developing a body of law through 
complaints and settlements that then serve as pseudo-precedent for 
practitioners.251 
The FTC’s norm-setting “soft law” function is solidified by its 
issuing of interpretive statements, policy guidance, and press 
releases.252 In 2012 the FTC issued a staff report following public 
comment on private sector use of facial recognition technology.253 
The FTC suggests that private actors should follow approaches that 
 
245 Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1432–33 (2017). 
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F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). 
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“implement privacy by design,” “simplify consumer choice,” and 
emphasize “transparen[cy].”254 While this approach provides an 
additional emphasis on data security, it fundamentally mirrors the 
notice-and-choice regimes used in other FTC regulation.255 As 
discussed below, a notice-and-choice framework remains tenuous 
for biometric data collection. Notably, FTC Commissioner Rosch 
dissented from the 2012 staff report.256 He emphasized that no harm 
occurred with the collection and use of biometrics as “[t]here is 
nothing to establish that this misconduct has occurred or even that it 
is likely to occur in the near future.”257 The FTC has never clearly 
articulated which parts of its recommendations are mandatory and 
which parts are best practices.258 Against a backdrop of shifting 
metrics of substantial consumer harm, it remains unclear what is the 
appropriate amount of protection that should be provided to this 
data. 
D. NTIA Multistakeholder Process 
In December of 2013 the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) announced that it would 
convene a multistakeholder process regarding the commercial use—
specifically use in retail—of facial recognition technology starting 
in early 2014.259 The goal of the process was to “develop a 
voluntary, enforceable code of conduct that . . . applies to facial 
recognition technology.”260 The NTIA referenced work by the FTC, 
industry organizations, and scholars suggesting “that the facial 
recognition topic is a strong opportunity for stakeholders to reach 
consensus on a code of conduct in a reasonable timeframe.”261 
However, after several meetings consumer privacy advocates 
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256 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at A2 (Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner J. 
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withdrew from the proceedings, citing a lack of guidance for 
business or protection of individuals under a standard of 
enforceability of “encouragement” rather than “requirement” for 
any adopted standards.262 The NTIA ultimately published a 
consensus document of the remaining stakeholders.263 While the 
utility of the finalized NTIA standards remains unclear,264 its results 
inform policy discussions on voluntary self-regulation of private 
sector facial recognition.265 The tension between consumer anxiety 
and the value of facial recognition to industry suggests that 
regulatory action may be necessary to set boundaries of permissible 
collection and usage. The following Part compares approaches from 
Illinois state law with the utility of the FTC’s present “unfair and 
deceptive practices” norm-setting regime under 
Section 5. 
III. “THE FULL RAMIFICATIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY ARE 
NOT FULLY KNOWN”266 
This Part considers the availability and shortcomings of current 
regulatory approaches for emerging facial recognition technologies. 
This Part first evaluates the potential of an individual rights regime, 
where public law recognizes a new right in individuals to 
informational privacy, limiting how biometric information may be 
collected and creating a right of action to enforce the right. Using 
the example of Illinois’ BIPA regime as a model of this approach, 
Section III.A considers the autonomy value of this approach, but 
also discusses the inherent problems with individual rights as a way 
 
262 Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Statement on NTIA Privacy Best 
Practices Recommendations for Commercial Recognition Use (June 15, 2016), 
https://consumerfed.org/press_release/statement-ntia-privacy-best-practice-
recommendations-commercial-facial-recognition-use/ [https://perma.cc/B9RX-9Q95]. 
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264 See NTIA Facial Recognition Best Practice Guidelines Meet Mixed Reception, 
BIOMETRIC TECH. TODAY at 1 (2016). 
265 Additionally, it is worth considering what the regulatory validity of a document issued 
through a multistakeholder process is after the withdrawal of stakeholders. For a more in-
depth discussion of the implications of multistakeholder processes and techno-policy see 
generally Nick Doty & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and 
Techno-Policy Standards, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135 (2013). 
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to regulate complex systems out of a widening information gap 
between consumers and private actors. This Section concludes that 
individual rights can serve only as a limited tool for fixing a system-
wide problem, because rights-bearing individuals and the statutory 
basis of those rights suffer from technical, behavioral, judicial 
expertise, and economic limitations. Section III.B then considers the 
potential of an FTC managerial regime, in which a regulatory “light 
touch” serves as a backstop to industry self-regulation. This Section 
finds that while the managerial regime benefits from the flexibility 
to develop policy gradually in response to rapidly changing 
technology, the present emphasis on user control may be ineffective 
when dealing with the unique issues presented by facial recognition. 
Finally, Section III.C considers the problems of the present 
incentive structures and market failures of self-regulatory regimes 
that may impede the development of an effective collaborative 
governance regime. 
A. The Problems of Statutory Individual-Rights 
To understand what individual-rights in information are created 
by biometric statutes, it is helpful to understand the history of 
BIPA’s enactment following the failure of the startup, Pay By 
Touch. In the early 2000s, Pay By Touch promised to “change the 
way the world pays” with a biometric authentication and payment 
system.267 The system enabled consumers to link various accounts 
(credit cards, checking accounts, loyalty programs, etc.) to their 
fingerprints, and then access those accounts or make payments with 
the touch of a finger, rather than by using cash or swiping a card.268 
However, when Pay by Touch filed for bankruptcy in 2007 its 
primary asset was an extensive collection of consumer 
fingerprints.269 BIPA was introduced into the Illinois Senate in 
 
267 Blaire Briody, We’re Getting Closer Than Ever to Paying with Our Fingerprints, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2013, 4:22 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/forget-credit-cards-
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268 Shubha, Failure Story: What Happened to Pay By Touch?, LET’S TALK PAYMENTS 
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://letstalkpayments.com/failure-story-what-happened-to-pay-by-
touch/ [https://perma.cc/2WDV-FZ3F]. 
269 See Lucy L. Thomson, Sensitive Personal Data for Sale in Bankruptcy—An Uncertain 
Future for Privacy Protection, 2017 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 12 (2017). The history of the 
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February 2008.270 During hearings on the bill in the Illinois House, 
Representative Kathy Ryg directly referenced the Pay By Touch 
bankruptcy, noting that it left “thousands of customers . . . 
wondering what will become of their biometric and financial 
data.”271 When the Illinois legislature passed BIPA, this sentiment 
was incorporated into the law’s preamble,272 emphasizing that the 
law targeted future harms that may arise from the use of the 
technology and stating that the “full ramifications of biometric 
technology are not fully known.”273  
While there was uncertainty surrounding the fate of data 
maintained by Pay By Touch, in 2008, the harms the Illinois 
Legislature addressed where predominantly speculative or based in 
perceived discomforts.274 In the absence of specific harm to address, 
BIPA’s approach codified an arguably arduous notice-and-choice 
regime requiring written consent. This was not the first occurrence 
of media coverage resulting in a reactive public law to address a 
nascent problem.275 However, passing laws based on technological 
potentialities risks miscalculating the harms and benefits of 
emerging technology, impeding development and creating 
disproportionate compliance costs.276  
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This Section analyzes the implications of BIPA and potential 
individual-rights models for regulating facial recognition.277 This 
Section starts by considering whether a rights-based statutory 
regime grounded in notice-and-choice appropriately protects 
privacy interests for emerging technologies. This Section then 
discusses the problem of statutory ossification, where static law fails 
to address how a unique technology develops and changes. Finally, 
this Section addresses the limitations of legislative reactions to 
consumer sensitivities in emerging technologies. 
1. Notice-and-Choice as an Ineffective Approach in Biometric 
Statutes 
BIPA requires that companies collecting biometric information 
provide notice to consumers, so they may choose to opt-out from the 
activity where collection occurs.278 This regime, however, is 
ineffective at protecting consumers from the privacy harms 
associated with facial recognition. 
Notice-and-choice in American law is based in the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). The FIPPs are a self-
regulatory regime promulgated by the FTC, requiring corporations 
to provide consumers with “notice,” “choice,” “access,” and 
“security.”279 The FIPPs of “notice” and “choice” have become the 
backbone of the federal and state self-regulatory approach since 
their introduction in 1973.280 However, the resilience of the FIPPs 
as a method for lawmakers to implement concepts of control, notice, 
and consent to protect privacy may suggest limitations in lawmakers 
abilities to conceptualize privacy—valuing libertarian notions of 
autonomy over consumer protection.281 
 
277 While the Washington and Texas law may provide some clarification on alternate 
legislative approaches, this Note views BIPA as the most significant approach, because of 
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The current regulatory regime presumes that when companies 
provide accurate information to consumers, consumers will make an 
informed choice to accept or reject the service, allowing effective 
self-regulation.282 The FTC has identified “notice” as “[t]he most 
fundamental principle.”283 Accordingly, privacy policies—the 
mechanism for providing notice—are essential to this model.284 
However, privacy policies are generally non-contractually 
enforceable285 statements of companies data practices, which are 
supposed to inform consumers what information platforms collect, 
how and for what purpose they collect it, and with whom they share 
it.286 This approach assumes that consumers then will have the 
opportunity to opt out of the service, avoiding any collection of their 
data.287 Proponents argue that notice-and-choice is an effective 
substitute for regulations because it is more flexible, inexpensive to 
implement, and easy to enforce.288 A wide range of legal critics 
suggest that in practice, this approach is ineffective because, no one 
reads privacy policies289 they are often long,290 difficult to 
understand,291 use legal jargon inaccessible to the average 
consumer,292 and even privacy experts finding them misleading.293 
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284 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 226, at 594. 
285 See Thomas B. Norton, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a New 
Critique of the Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 189–90 (2016) (discussing that individual consumers cannot sue 
for breach of contract based on privacy policies because courts do not find cognizable harm 
that is required in a contract claim). 
286 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 226, at 592. 
287 Id. at 592. 
288 Reidenberg et al., supra note 204, at 489. 
289 See, e.g., George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies For Reducing Online Privacy 
Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE 
MARKETING 15 (2004). 
290 See, e.g., T.J. Ortenzi, Facebook Privacy Policy Explained: It’s Longer than the 
Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2010/05/12/facebook-privacy-policy-s_n_574389.html [https://perma.cc/7JLH-ZXA2]. 
291 Reidenberg et al., supra note 204, at 491. 
292 Id. at 491. 
293 Reidenberg et al., supra note 281, at 87–88. 
656         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
In a 2014 report on big data, the U.S. President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology stated that “the framework of 
notice and consent is also becoming unworkable as a useful 
foundation for policy.”294 Woodrow Hartzog emphasizes that at best 
the notice-and-choice model of individual “control” is an illusion.295 
This result stems from an inherent power imbalance between 
uninformed consumers and companies capable of using adversarial 
design choices that wear down consumer resistance, manufacturing 
permissive consumer consent.296 Such an imbalance results in a lack 
of ability for meaningful privacy self-management, where 
individuals can do very little to effectuate their preferences.297 This 
is not a new realization.298 Ultimately, notice-and-choice may be an 
unworkable model for consumer control and self-management of 
data collection practices. 
The collection of facial recognition biometrics by retailers is 
uniquely problematic under a notice-and-choice regime. Use of 
facial recognition for identity verification or payment systems 
typically involves use of an application or preregistration of an 
account on a website.299 Upon downloading a required application, 
the collection of facial recognition for identity verification can 
 
294 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, BIG 
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECH. PERSPECTIVE (May 2014). 
295 HARTZOG, supra note 95, at 64. 
296 Id. at 64–67. 
297 See generally Daniel Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013). In part, this is because the dominant model offered by 
civil society organizations for individuals to push back against mass data collection 
advances an individualized understanding of resistance in which the onus is on the 
individual to change their behavior. This means that challenging data collection becomes 
an individualized act based on perceived skill and ability to engage in privacy-enhancing 
digital practices, such as downloading encrypted software, using anonymized browsers, 
and changing security settings. Lobbying for policy reform and engaging in litigation 
activism, meanwhile, is often bounded by technical and issue-specific expertise that 
confines the debate to a small constituency of experts. See Arne Hintz & Ian Brown, 
Enabling Digital Citizenship? The Reshaping of Surveillance Policy After Snowden, 11 
INT’L J. COMM’N 782, 796 (2017). 
298 In 1967, Arthur R. Miller presciently warned a Senate subcommittee that “[e]xcessive 
reliance should not be placed on what too often is viewed as a universal solvent—the 
concept of consent.” Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., First Session 78 (1967). 
299 BIPA defines “Written release” as “informed written consent.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
14/10 (2008). 
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readily be incorporated into a browse-wrap privacy policy,300 or in 
the case of BIPA’s more rigorous written consent requirement,301 a 
clickwrap agreement.302 While courts have not articulated if a 
browsewrap agreement could satisfy BIPA,303 in litigation on 
whether clickwrap satisfies BIPA’s notice and consent, courts 
appear to suggest that a clickwrap agreement will satisfy BIPA’s 
written notice and consent requirement.304 Given the asymmetry of 
information between corporations and consumers it is unlikely that 
consumer control through BIPA’s individual-rights will accomplish 
more than increased corporate reliance on contractual terms that are 
adhesive in practice.305 
The higher degree of consumer awareness of the technology’s 
use may alleviate some privacy risk of collection, but the lack of 
restrictions on “function creep”306 likely results in situations where 
 
300 Browsewrap agreements are visible on a separate webpage accessible via a hyperlink 
on the main webpage; a website user may click that link to visit, view, and read the site’s 
terms. See Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are 
Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 174 (2007). 
301 See supra Section II.A. 
302 Under the clickwrap model, a website or application presents a user with the 
applicable terms and requires that the user assent to those terms by clicking an icon. See 
Norton, supra note 284, at 191. 
303 See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954–56 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
304 See, e.g., In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1166–
67 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that plaintiffs agreed to the user agreement through a 
clickwrap that stated “I have read and understood the Terms of Use, and I agree to them,” 
for choice of law purposes and allowing claim to proceed); see also Vigil v. Take-Two 
Interactive Software, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 505–07, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software Inc., 717 F. 
App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2017). 
305 For an interesting discussion on the question of whether the nature of a contract of 
adhesion creates a duty in the corporation to avoid harming the consumer as an information 
fiduciary see Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS. L. REV. 1183 (2016) (discussing the concept of fiduciary “duties of trust” for 
information collectors); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 19, 2012), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06
/big-data-brokers-as-fiduciaries.html [https://perma.cc/5VMZ-65CH] (discussing the use 
of fiduciary law to address the imbalance between consumers and corporations). 
306 A “function creep” occurs when “databases created for one discrete purpose, despite 
the initial promises of their creators, eventually take on new functions and purposes.” Tania 
Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for 
Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 283 (2005); see also BRETT 
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consumer expectations do not match the scope of how consumer 
information will be used. Given movement to an omnichannel 
approach by retailers, consumers may provide consent to facial 
recognition for purposes of the statute by agreeing to clickwrap 
terms while using retailer website or applications. 
Surveillance is additionally problematic under a rights-based 
regime. A main selling point of using facial recognition for remote 
surveillance is its “frictionless” ability to collect information 
without consumer awareness.307 Using facial recognition in retail 
settings complicates how a notice-and-choice regime could work 
effectively. Any posted notice would likely be ignored, and there is 
no practical way to obtain written consent that would not be unduly 
burdensome on a retailer.308 While it has not been litigated, under a 
biometric statute like Washington’s that does not require written 
consent, entry into a location with a clearly posted notice stating 
“warning by entering into this store you may be subjected to facial 
recognition” could qualify as consent.309 
The lack of clear obligations creates uncertain liabilities, 
resulting in a lose-lose situation where, due to information 
asymmetries, consumers readily negotiate away their privacy 
entitlements or businesses avoiding using the technology 
altogether.310 While it is debatable where the latter result is 
 
FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 20–21 (2018) (discussing 
“surveillance creep”). 
307 See, e.g., The Frictionless Future of Face Recognition, NEC https://www.nec.com
/en/global/highlights/safety/campaign/pdf/airport_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVS5-K5B3] 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018). The technology is “frictionless” in that it is designed to avoid 
consumer interaction with the technology or recognition that they are being subjected to a 
technological process. Id. 
308 The possibility of using geofencing to send consumer phones a notice for acceptance 
when they enter a location using the technology is interesting but likely unworkable as not 
all consumers use or carry phones. See Sarah K. White, What Is Geofencing? Putting 
Location to Work, CIO (Nov. 1, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.cio.com/article/2383123
/geofencing-explained.html [https://perma.cc/7RRE-TYUJ].   
309 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(2) (2017). Washington’s law states that 
“notice” is “given through a procedure reasonably designed to be readily available to 
affected individuals” and is “context-dependent.” Id. 
310 Masooda Bashir et al., Online Privacy and Informed Consent: The Paradox of 
Information Asymmetry, Proc. ASIST 78th Ann. Meeting (2015), https://www.asist.org
/files/meetings/am15/proceedings/submissions/papers/97paper.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F4JA-9UQ6]; Ally Marotti, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t Available in Illinois. Here’s Why, 
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ultimately more beneficial to consumers,311 this outcome is 
antithetical to the argument of proponents of notice and choice that 
it avoids the overregulation of legitimate business interests.312 
2. The Risks of Statutory Ossification 
Legislation of emerging technologies runs the risk of 
miscomprehending future implications and codifying technical 
knowledge and potential harms at a static point. While this risk 
occurs to some degree in all legislation, because technological 
development is inherently fluid, regulatory interventions may result 
in heightened risks of inadequately addressing new uses or, as 
discussed above, corporate actors routing uses around regulations. 
How BIPA defines and uses terms relating to biometrics provides 
an example of the predictive limitations of public law and 
corresponding “ossification” risks. 313 
An example of this tendency in BIPA is the lack of a definition 
for “collection.” Section 15(b) states that “[n]o private entity may 
collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain 
[biometric information].” While there are situations in which a 
corporation is clearly storing faceprints in a database, the process of 
transcoding information that occurs when generating faceprints does 
 
Chi. Trib., Jan. 17, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-google-art-
selfies-20180116-story.html [https://perma.cc/YGD4-8BML] (last viewed Mar. 16, 2019). 
See also Erica Gunderson, Biometric Data: Are We Safer in Illinois, or Just Having Less 
Fun?, WTTW (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:07 PM), https://news.wttw.com/2018/01/22/biometric-
data-are-we-safer-illinois-or-just-having-less-fun [https://perma.cc/V8PP-LRBU] 
(mentioning Google’s choice to geoblock access in Illinois and Texas to its Arts and 
Culture application to avoid any possible liability under BIPA). 
311 See Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 10 (discussing a need for a moratorium on all 
usage of facial recognition). 
312 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV 1027, 1049–50 (2012); see also Kenneth A. Bamberg & Deirdre K. Mulligan, 
Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 303 (2011) (“The 
shortcomings of command-and-control governance . . . are well recognized.”). 
313 In Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Mead Corp., he discusses the risk of 
“ossification” where procedural requirements in administrative rulemaking limit the ability 
to change policy or interpretation. 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J. Dissenting). As 
discussed further below, this Note uses “ossification” to describe situations where privacy 
entitlements created by legislation increase the political capital required to amend a law, 
limiting the flexibility of enacted statutes. 
660         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
not clearly delineate when “collection” has occurred.314 With 
products on the market such as those provided by FaceFirst, it is 
unclear if scanning a face and then comparing it to a database would 
constitute collection if the faceprint is not retained after 
comparison.315 These statutory gaps for growing uses of the 
technology then force judicial interpretation in ways that may 
exceed their institutional competence. 
When BIPA was enacted, the Illinois legislature could not 
predict all future commercial uses of biometrics.316 Present state 
approaches lack institutional guidance with technical expertise in 
facilitating the development of the statute.317 While Washington’s 
law incorporates more nuanced definitions, there is a need for 
flexibility in adjusting statutes for evolving risks and presently 
unknown problems.318 In addition, because judges often lack 
substantive expertise in matters of a highly technical nature, they 
should assert caution and deference in construing statutes pertaining 
to nascent technologies.319 
The risk of statutory misinterpretation is compounded by 
heightened resistance to legislative amendment. Two attempts to 
amend BIPA resulted in contentious negotiation breakdowns 
between civil society organizations, technology lobbyists, and 
Illinois legislators.320 This legislative neutralization may be inherent 
to individual-rights regimes. BIPA creates a limited entitlement in 
consumers of controlling their biometric data and a resulting duty in 
corporations to follow certain procedural requirements.321 However, 
after the entitlement is defined, consumers assign a higher value to 
 
314 See supra Section I.A.2. 
315 See supra Section I.C. 
316 See supra notes 197–217 and accompanying text. 
317 See supra Section II.A. 
318 See supra Section II.A. 
319 See Olivier Sylvain, Disruption and Deference, 74 MD. L. REV. 715, 761–68 (2015) 
(noting in Sony v. Universal Studios that the Supreme Court stated that judges are generally 
less capable of “accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that 
are inevitably implicated by such new technology”). 
320 See Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Illinois Considering Amendments to Biometric Privacy Law 
(BIPA) That Would Create Major Exemptions to its Scope, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/illinois-considering-amendments-to-biometric-
privacy-law-bipa-would-create-major [https://perma.cc/MEZ9-2XTK]. 
321 See Cohen, supra note 91, at 1391. 
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the right and are likely more resistant to any activities perceived as 
displacing or removing the right.322 As Julie E. Cohen has noted 
control oriented privacy rights that function as a limited property 
right reinforce persistent inequalities, by raising the social capital 
cost of amendment and incentivizing corporations to negotiate and 
consolidate consumer rights through contractual terms.323 Cohen 
emphasizes that the fixation on consumer “control” through a 
libertarian notion of “autonomy,” is itself a market failure that gives 
undue power to adhesive contractual relationships.324 This suggests 
an incongruence between the present level of resistance by 
entrenched parties and the corresponding amount of protection the 
law provides consumers.325 Rights-based statutes’ tend to ossify 
results in delegating interpretation to narrow litigation interests, and 
in creating ambiguity between the statute’s terms, the technology it 
regulates, and a consumer-centric interests without any organization 
tasked with interpretation. 
3. The Problem of Regulating Anxiety 
An added complexity of legislation is the disconnect between 
consumer anxieties and technological expertise. In a recent survey 
of American fears, participants were far more fearful of corporate 
tracking of personal information than loneliness, theft, or death.326 
Consumer discomfort with facial recognition suggests a similar 
underlying trend.327 The introduction of new technologies often 
generates anxiety.328 In the early 1980s, the introduction of the 
 
322 See id. at 1397–98. 
323 See id. at 1391 (“Recognizing property rights in personally-identified data risks 
enabling more, not less, trade and producing less, not more, privacy.”). 
324 Id. at 1399–1402. 
325 See, e.g., Neuburger, supra note 319. 
326 See Cari Romm, Americans Are More Afraid of Robots than Death, THE ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/americans-are-
more-afraid-of-robots-than-death/410929/ [https://perma.cc/4Y7Q-UL83]. 
327 See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
328 Romm, supra note 325 ( “People tend to express the highest level of fear for things 
they’re dependent on but that they don’t have any control over, and that’s almost a perfect 
definition of technology.”). However, it shouldn’t be overlooked as Thomas Pynchon noted 
in 1984—the year of the release of the “disruptive” Macintosh personal computer—that 
these “Luddite” anxieties are actually a proxy of the fear and negative consequences of 
sociological and economic changes that accompany technological shifts, rather than fear 
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personal computer led to instances of “computerphobia,” where 
sufferers experienced “a range of resistances, fears, anxieties, and 
hostilities,” including “feeling that you can be replaced by a 
machine, [or] become a slave to it.”329 The history of BIPA’s 
passage reflects similar anxiety around new technology.330 While all 
public law addresses speculation of future harms but limits recovery 
by requiring standing,331 the more prescient question is whether 
anxieties about emerging technologies should be incorporated into 
a cost-benefit analysis of legislative interventions. 
Cass Sunstein argues that individuals’ cognitive biases towards 
the immediacy of perceived new risks lead to “probability neglect,” 
where legal institutions may overcompensate to address consumer 
concerns leading to “costly expenditures for little or no gain.”332 
Due to the latent cultural significance of the face, the technology 
may cause a heightened emotional response, where “people tend to 
focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood.”333 While the 
harms relating to facial recognition carry the potential of both 
subjective and object harms, legislation that overcompensates for 
short-term fears may fail at assessing an appropriate normative 
balance in light of individuals’ capacity to adjust.334 
This is not to suggest that the potential harms of facial 
recognition are inconsequential, only that setting an entitlement 
based on the most sensitive parties at a point of heightened anxiety 
creates an incongruent valuation.335 It is, however, difficult for 
legislatures to account for the adjustment of public perception where 
harms that are intangible (or at minimum difficult to assess based on 
 
of the technology itself. Thomas Pynchon, Is It O.K. To Be a Luddite?, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 
28, 1984) (“The word ‘Luddite’ continues to be applied with contempt to anyone with 
doubts about technology, especially the nuclear kind.”). 
329 ANNA FRANCES GRUNDY & JOHN GRUNDY, WOMEN AND COMPUTERS 20 (1996). 
330 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (d), (f) (2008) (“An overwhelming majority of 
members of the public are wary of the use of biometrics . . . . The full ramifications of 
biometric technology are not fully known.”). 
331 See Solove & Citron, supra note 107, at 750 (discussing judicial limitations on 
“speculative harms” as not conferring standing). 
332 Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and the Law, 112 
YALE L.J. 61, 62–63 (2002). 
333 SUNSTEIN, supra note 275, at 5. 
334 See Sunstein, supra note 331, at 62–63. 
335 See id. 
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costs and benefits) and information asymmetry strongly favor 
corporate interests. Sunstein suggests that because representative 
institutions are susceptible to error, responding to public anxieties 
will create pressures to act in ways that may not ultimately respond 
to individual’s “reflective values.”336 As a result, providing 
consumers with a right in facial recognition, even with the capacity 
of class action litigation, likely will not lead to norm-setting.337 
In such a context, identifying infringement upon an individual 
privacy right as the core harm produced by mass data collection may 
mitigate the power structures that shape digital infrastructures. 
Individual privacy self-management may do little to overcome or 
change them. The subsequent Section discusses authority available 
to the FTC and considers if and how agencies or may mediate 
between consumer anxieties and technological development. 
B. The FTC and the Problems of Regulating Opaque and  
Hidden Usage 
As described above, an individual-rights model suffers from the 
erroneous conception of the consumer as a fully autonomous 
individual with the capacity to make informed privacy enhancing 
decisions.338 Recognizing this limitation suggests that managerial 
methods may provide more effective control of highly 
informationalized processes that require governance institutions 
capable of responding with expertise and discretion.339 This Part 
discusses the capabilities of the FTC and managerial regulation of 
facial recognition, considering the degree to which the FTC can 
facilitate consumer protective norms as a “privacy norm 
entrepreneur.”340 Section B.1 finds that the FTC’s present regulatory 
posture may overemphasize notice-and-choice and incentivize 
corporate behavior antithetical to an effective self-regulatory 
 
336 Id. at 102–03. 
337 As discussed supra Section III.A.1, rights that can be contractually negotiated away 
will likely lead to a result where the interests of the most sensitive (or litigious) parties are 
protected, with little residual benefit to consumers who can negotiate away their 
protections. 
338 See COHEN, supra note 36, at 9, 32–33. 
339 See JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 38 (forthcoming 2019). 
340 See generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000). 
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regime. Ultimately, Section B.2 considers the value of the 
underutilized “unfairness” authority, but recognizes that likely 
obstructions may encumber the emergence of consumer protection 
norms under the current regime. 
1. Deceptive Practices Actions May Undermine  
Transparency Norms 
In states that have biometric laws requiring notice, or that 
mandate privacy policies for consumer-facing companies,341 the 
FTC may bring enforcement actions for misrepresentations within 
privacy policies.342 The FTC’s action against Nomi Technologies 
provides an example of how this authority may be used and its 
relative strengths and weaknesses as a regulatory mechanism for 
facial recognition in retail. 
In 2015, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Nomi 
Technologies, a company in the retail technology sector that offered 
brick-and-mortar clients the ability to analyze aggregate data about 
consumer traffic in the merchants’ stores.343 The FTC alleged that 
Nomi misled consumers with promises that it would provide an in-
store mechanism for consumers to opt out of tracking and that 
consumers would be informed when locations were using Nomi’s 
tracking services.344 
In dissenting statements on the action, Commissioner Maureen 
Ohlhausen reflected the tension between the goals of consumer 
control and the desire for corporate participation and transparency 
norms.345 Commissioner Ohlhausen stated that the action fails to 
balance consumer harms with the FTC’s goal of “transparency” as 
it “imposes a penalty far out of proportion to . . . consumer harm,” 
because Nomi “went beyond its legal duty” by offering a consumer-
facing design intervention in its product “with an easy and effective 
 
341 See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 
120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 777, 793 (2016). 
342 See supra Section II.C. 
343 Complaint at ¶¶ 3–5, In re Nomi Techs., 2015 FTC Lexis 213 (F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2015) 
(No. C-4538). 
344 Id. at ¶¶ 15–17. 
345 Dissenting Statement of Comm’r Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In re Nomi Techs, Inc., 
(F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2015) (Matter No. 132-3251). 
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global opt-out.”346 Commenters on the action have noted that by 
pursuing Nomi, the FTC is creating an implicit incentive where 
companies are subjected to higher liability where they are more 
transparent than when they are vague or “not offering an opt-out 
mechanism at all.”347 
The problem may be inherent to the FTC’s “deceptive practices” 
power where situations under which the FTC can file a complaint 
are relatively limited348 and the FTC lacks the explicit authority to 
generally protect online consumer privacy.349 In the absence of this 
authority, the FTC cannot mandate that companies have privacy 
policies, creating a “curious situation whereby a company without a 
privacy policy is arguably less likely to be punished for privacy-
invasive practices than a company with a privacy policy.”350 This 
situation leads to an implicit incentive where companies that are 
vague about their commitments to privacy or that have a general 
privacy policy utilizing boilerplate language typically will be 
immune from action under Section 5 authority.351 
The shortcomings of this approach may suggest a shifting status 
of the influence of technology on consumers’ everyday lives. When 
the central approach of the FTC was incentivizing disclosure 
through privacy policies, noncompliance was obvious, and the FTC 
could serve a more disengaged and entrepreneurial role.352 
However, where facial recognition practices in retail are inherently 
nontransparent and involve complex systems with multiple actors 
and hard-to-calculate risks, this approach may incentivize market 
 
346 Id. 
347 James S. DeGraw et al., Nomi Highlights Risks of Publicizing Privacy Policies, 
LAW360 (May 27, 2015, 8:21 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/659398/nomi-
highlights-risks-of-publicizing-privacy-policies [https://perma.cc/A8BK-FJGV]. 
348 See Reidenberg et al., supra note 203, at 509. 
349 See id. 
350 See Federal Trade Commission: Overview of Statutory Authority to Remedy Privacy 
Infringements, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org//privacy/internet/ftc/Authority
.html [https://perma.cc/Q64A-RHBW] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
351 See CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 216 
(2016) (“The FTC’s deceptive power is not a perfect tool for policing information security 
problems.”). 
352 See generally Hetcher, supra note 340. 
666         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
failure in self-regulation.353 The incentive structure towards opaque 
practices that evade regulatory friction is already apparent in 
companies that use facial recognition.354 While deceptive practices 
could serve as a regulatory mechanism for FTC enforcement of data 
privacy norms for facial recognition in retail, this approach may 
have the inadvertent result of reinforcing lack of transparency by 
companies that use the technology.355 This outcome is especially 
problematic because low-compliance obligations do not 
meaningfully displace or regulate practices, while the high value of 
consumer information incentivizing collection cannot be 
meaningfully regulated by optimistic notions of corporate 
responsibility.356 As a result, the FTC’s present posture may 
ultimately facilitate continued market failure rather than effective 
self-regulatory behavior.357 
2. Unfair Practices Authority May Enable Limited Norm 
Development 
The Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the FTCA provide broad 
regulatory latitude to the FTC for defining new practices as 
“unfair.”358 The FTC has historically understood the unfairness 
standard as “the result of an evolutionary process. . . . deliberately 
framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility 
of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not 
 
353 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: A Two-Part Approach to Accountable 
Algorithms 4, 17–19 (forthcoming 2019). 
354 See, e.g., Our Privacy Commitment, FACEFIRST, https://www.facefirst.com/privacy-
commitment/ [https://perma.cc/JV3V-6FMV] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). FaceFirst’s 
website only includes a privacy policy for its website, which does not discuss the use of its 
products by retailers. See id. FaceFirst’s representations in its website section titled 
“Commitment to Privacy” contain language such as “we encourage customers to post 
signage alerting customers when that biometric surveillance is being used” that creates no 
enforceable commitment in FaceFirst as the technology provider. Id. 
355 Shawn A. Johnson, A Law and Economics Approach to Privacy Policy Misstatements: 
Considering the Need for a Cost-Benefits Analysis in the FTC’s Deception Framework, 18 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 98–99 (2016) (“The true harm implicated in Nomi is the 
market failure that occurs when consumers are deprived of accurate information with 
which to make informed choices.”). 
356 See COHEN, supra note 338, at 44. 
357 See Cohen, supra note 91, at 1395. 
358 See supra Section II.C. 
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quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion.”359 
Notably, the FTC can find a practice unfair even when it is otherwise 
legally permissible.360 This vagueness in definition creates value in 
the FTC’s flexibility to address new problems.361 This flexibility is 
valuable in regulating new information flows—like facial 
recognition—where market forces have power to route around 
inconvenient regulatory resistance by redefining or obscuring the 
regulated process.362 
The FTC is an appropriate body to regulate emerging 
technologies through the historical expertise of the agency in 
technological matters.363 Additionally, the agency’s history of 
action, allowing regulation of consumer harms that fall outside the 
scope of traditional torts and regulatory efforts, affords a more 
deferential posture by the courts to the agency’s expanding 
definitions of its own authority.364 This Part discusses available FTC 
authority under Section 5 unfair powers and the possibility of direct 
enforcement actions against facial recognition in retail settings. 
3. Enforcing Data Security Norms 
For the FTC to act the harm must be substantial.365 While the 
most dominant kind of substantial harm asserted by the FTC has 
been monetary, notions of harm under unfairness have been steadily 
evolving over the past twenty years.366 In FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp.367 the court found that “non-monetary harm” may 
 
359 FED. TRADE COMM’N POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, App. to Int’l Harvester 
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). 
360 Spiegel v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he Supreme Court left no 
doubt that the FTC had the authority to prohibit conduct that, although legally proper, was 
unfair to the public.”). 
361 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 350, at 30. 
362 See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEOR. INQ. L. 
369, 385–87 (2016). 
363 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 350, at 30 (discussing the FTC’s pivots to the emerging 
technologies of radio and television to regulate unfair and deceptive practices). 
364 See Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 814 
(2015). 
365 See supra Section II.C. 
366 See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 226. 
367 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014). 
668         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:611 
 
support an action.368 The Third Circuit did not clarify this point, and 
this authority is not yet stable.369 Nonetheless, the FTC likely has 
the authority to address data security failings that lead to breach and 
theft of facial recognition information. 
In Wyndham the court found that the agency could bring an 
adjudicatory action where reasonable notice was provided through 
industry guidance sources, the FTC’s guidance, and consent orders 
from previous FTC enforcement actions.370 The increasing quantity 
of information available to businesses through the FTC and internal 
trade groups on reasonable data security approaches likely indicates 
that a failure on the level of Wyndham by a retailer or facial 
recognition software provider would justify an FTC action 
especially where facial recognition data is particularly 
“sensitive.”371 
This pattern suggests that the FTC could bring adjudication 
actions to mandate encryption of facial recognition data at rest and 
transmission.372 Considered under the policy statement on 
 
368 Id. at 623 n.15 (noting, however, that “the Court need not reach this issue given the 
substantial analysis of the substantial harm element above”). 
369 See LabMd, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275 (2015); see also Ava Farshidi, The New Retail 
Experience, and its Unaddressed Privacy Concerns: How RFID and Mobile Location 
Analytics Are Collecting Customer Information, 7 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 
15, 25–26 (2016). But see Daniel Solove, Did the LabMD Case Weaken the FTC’s 
Approach to Data Security?, LINKEDIN (June 8, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com
/pulse/did-labmd-case-weaken-ftcs-approach-data-security-daniel-solove/ 
[https://perma.cc/A5C9-SXUW] (stating that the Eleventh Circuit opinion focuses on the 
particulars of the order the FTC sought against LabMD, not on the underlying theory of 
unfairness or on the use of negligence as a standard to find unfairness and therefore does 
not create a split with the Third Circuit). 
370 Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 616–17. 
371 This Note suggests that it would be within the scope of the FTC’s evolutionary process 
to include faceprints within definitions of “sensitive personal information” information that 
poses heightened privacy concerns that require heightened restrictions. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUS. AND POLICYMAKERS, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-
rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4KB-N576]; 
see also Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data 
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 805–06 (2017). 
372 Encryption is the process of transforming information so that only the person (or 
computer) with the key can read it. Encryption technology for sensitive data “at rest” refers 
to information while it is on a server, while “in transit” refers to transferring information 
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unfairness cost-benefit analysis framework, the unique harms of not 
encrypting faceprints likely meets the standard of an unfair practice. 
Even if individual harm to consumers is low and predominantly 
subjective, in the aggregate, the harms are substantial.373 While a 
company not using encryption reduces its own compliance costs, 
this practice does not increase market competition as a whole, and, 
it is highly unlikely that the costs avoided outvalue the net harm of 
taking no action.374 Where the facial recognition information was 
collected remotely and without active consumer knowledge, there is 
little likelihood of avoiding the harm caused.375 Analogous to Justice 
Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland,376 the “risk of 
surveillance” here is unavoidable even if some form of notice is 
provided because “[i]t is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts 
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic 
alternate.”377 Suggesting that consumers can choose to not go to 
brick-and-mortar retailers is not a realistic policy position. Because 
the unfairness balancing test has the flexibility to incorporate public 
policy considerations in situations of nominal “consent” that the 
deceptive test cannot,378 regulators may balance the inefficiency of 
consumer attempts to avoid retail establishments for fear of future 
breach or surveillance harms as a harm for both consumers and 
retailers.379 
 
across websites, on devices, or in the cloud. Thomas B. Paul, Stick with Security: Store 
Sensitive Personal Information Securely and Protect It During Transmission, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2017, 8:59 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2017/08/stick-security-store-sensitive-personal-information-securely 
[https://perma.cc/BCL6-589C]. 
373 See supra Section I.B. 
374 Johnson, supra note 354, at 115–16 (2016). 
375 See supra Section I.B.1; see also Hartzog, supra note 363, at 798 (noting that in a 
spyware case under the unfair authority the FTC noted that substantial harm was caused to 
consumers from invasive surveillance and recognized concerns that “[c]onsumers cannot 
reasonably avoid these injuries because [the surveillance] is invisible to them”). 
376 442 U.S. 735, 748–52 (1979). 
377 Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
378 See supra Section III.A.1. 
379 While it could be argued that this approach could result in a competition benefit that 
incentivizes privacy markets where consumers choose to go to stores that do not use facial 
recognition, as discussed supra Section I.B.1, the incentives inherent for nondisclosure of 
practices presently makes this model unrealistic. 
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Whether the FTC can take prospective actions relating to 
perceived data security failings in the absence of breach is a more 
tenuous question. While the Wyndham court and the unfairness 
guidance leaves this possibility open, this action would run contrary 
to the agency’s historical pattern of enforcement.380 The FTC frames 
this deference to industry as a strength by promoting coregulatory 
regimes.381 Through enforcing industry-specific consumer 
protection measures the FTC uses its limited resources towards 
setting norms on the margins of industry practice, setting the 
boundary of acceptable behavior.382 However, while this “soft 
touch” approach generally benefits industry by limiting compliance 
obligations, the practical success of this approach requires the FTC 
to take action when a violation occurs, particularly by a prominent 
industry player or a particularly egregious violation.383 However, as 
discussed infra, passive deference to industry activities and 
“corporate responsibility” may result in consumer harms in the 
absence of breach. 
4. Enforcing Use, Data Minimization, and Transparency 
Norms 
The FTC’s unfairness power is more attenuated for harms 
relating to unexpected use or those exceeding expected use, where 
no breach has occurred. This is likely due to multiple factors: (1) a 
practical complexity in the economics of accurately balancing harm 
and benefit where harms are difficult to quantify the loss of privacy 
and the benefits of increased data collection is a quantifiable market 
good;384 (2) agency aversion to judicial reversal;385 (3) an 
 
380 See supra Section III.B.1. 
381 COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY SETTLEMENT, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 31, 2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/140131gmrstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVF8-G8M6]. 
382 See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2262 (2015). 
383 David A. DeMarco, Understanding Consumer Information Privacy in the Realm of 
Internet Commerce: Personhood and Pragmatism, Pop-Tarts and Six-Packs, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1013, 1037 (2006). 
384 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 350, at 337–38. 
385 See id. 334. 
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information gap between the regulators and industry;386 (4) general 
deference to industry interests;387 and (5) a historical tendency to 
enter into new areas using its deceptive power first.388 However, the 
unfairness authority may be a more appropriate tool for balancing 
consumer privacy interests against information accumulation 
business models.389 
Enforcement of facial recognition under the unfairness authority 
is difficult precisely because the balancing test for unfairness 
requires accounting for benefits to consumers and competition 
conferred through use of the technology. In the absence of a breach, 
subjective consumer harms may not outweigh retailors benefits of 
increasing information flows or proving convenient services. The 
FTC’s action against Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data) provides 
a framework of how to shift the agency’s reliance from deceptive to 
unfairness authority using standards-based governance. In 2008, the 
FTC alleged that N-Data violated Section 5 of the FTCA by 
engaging in unfair acts or practices related to a promise not to 
enforce its patents to an essential Ethernet standard for local area 
networks (LAN).390 The FTC alleged that N-Data’s unfair practices 
were unfair reneging on a license agreement with the IEEE based on 
a standard that had been set by the industry.391 The FTC found that 
“the type of behavior engaged in by N-Data harms consumers,” 
because “[t]he process of establishing a standard displaces 
competition; therefore, bad faith or deceptive behavior that 
undermines the process may also undermine competition in an entire 
industry, raise prices to consumers, and reduce choices.”392 In N-
Data, the FTC signaled an intention to expand its Section 5 
 
386 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big 
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1379 (2015). 
387 See supra Section II.C. 
388 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 350, at 347. 
389 Id. (arguing that the failure of communication and customer relationship that lead to 
the Nomi enforcement was an “unfairness case[] dressed in a deception theory”). 
390 Theresa R. Stadheim, Rambus, N-Data, and the FTC: Creating Efficient Incentives in 
Patent Holders and Optimizing Consumer Welfare in Standards-Setting Organizations, 19 
ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 483, 499 (2009) 
391 Id. 
392 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, 
ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 233 (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2018). 
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enforcement in the context of high-tech markets based on 
participation in standards set by private standard-setting 
organizations.393 In doing so, the FTC suggested an interpretation of 
the unfairness authority where a standard may be used both as the 
norm to be enforced and the mechanism for enforcement. 
While N-Data has not yet proven to be the inflection point in the 
FTC’s shift to this approach, the unfairness power’s ability to 
facilitate and enforce norms created by private actors is coherent 
with the FTC’s authority and history.394 However, shifting to 
reliance on standard setting organizations creates new complexities 
to traditional enforcement models.395 Julie E. Cohen argues that the 
shift to a standards-based governance structure reshapes modes of 
lawmaking and enforcement, where traditional modes of authority 
are “being outpaced by sociotechnical change.”396 Standards may 
compensate for the market failure in self-regulation that occurs from 
“information asymmetries that preclude the exercise of informed 
choice.”397 Additionally, standards may allow for a correction to the 
competitive structures, which ultimately result in the collection 
imperative as industry members search for any and all new sources 
of data out of a need to compete with the substantial advantages held 
by large players like Amazon, who already collect massive amounts 
of consumer data accumulation across platforms. A 
multistakeholder approach, where interest holders mandate 
standards for FTC enforcement, would be a beneficial alternative to 
direct and reactive participation by the public, due to a lack of 
expertise in understanding the ways in which technical 
commitments “implicate, reflect, reinforce, and sometimes 
predetermine policy commitments.”398 
 
393 Amy Marshak, The Federal Trade Commission on the Frontier: Suggestions for the 
Use of Section 5, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1137–38 (2011). 
394 See supra Section II.C. 
395 COHEN, supra note 338, at 16. 
396 Id. 
397 Cohen, supra note 91, at 1395. 
398 COHEN, supra note 338, at 38–39 (noting that “network organization under mandated 
standardization creates a paradox” where the need to effectively govern opaque 
organizations results in an agency that is itself opaquer and less accountable to the broader 
public.). 
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5. Systemic Failures in Negotiations at the NTIA 
The problem, however, of an FTC mandated standard regime for 
facial recognition in retail is that this approach was already 
attempted by the NTIA and failed in achieving its goal of creating a 
clear, voluntary, and actionable policy.399 The draft document 
produced after the walk-out of privacy advocates created a lower 
level of obligations than the FTC’s own recommendations.400 As 
Margot E. Kaminski notes, “the NTIA failure indicates that the 
current backdrop of potential FTC enforcement is not enough to get 
the industry to the table.”401 FTC enforcement of the codes of 
conduct themselves may drive the industry to view both the 
negotiation and adoption of codes of conduct as “leading to more 
likely enforcement by the FTC.”402 This scenario creates an 
incentive scheme that is “backwards” because, “industry views the 
NTIA codes of conduct as potentially creating a penalty, not 
avoiding one.”403 
The increased possibility of FTC enforcement creates an 
implicitly collusive free rider problem where the industry is 
discouraged from adopting codes of conduct once they have been 
created. Furthermore, the industry is averse to negotiating, out of 
fear that completed codes might be viewed as actual industry 
standards by the FTC, therefore driving FTC enforcement even 
without explicit adoption of the codes by particular players.404 Such 
an outcome is exacerbated by civil society stakeholders, responding 
to the lack of negotiation, by hardening a demand for a rights-based 
regime.405 While the FTC can “more visibly play the hammer” by 
entering directly into the regulation of facial recognition, Kaminski 
notes a paradox of this approach where new industries without 
 
399 See supra Section II.D. 
400 Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the 
NTIA, 93 DENV. L. REV. 925, 935 (2016). 
401 Id. at 946–47. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. 
405 See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, EFF and Eight Other Privacy Organizations Back Out of 
NTIA Face Recognition Multi-Stakeholder Process, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 
16, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/eff-and-eight-other-privacy-
organizations-back-out-ntia-face-recognition-multi [https://perma.cc/62DT-BQ5K]. 
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standards make FTC enforcement more difficult, reducing the 
leverage of their ability to encourage real negotiations in new 
technological space.406 The next Part considers what actions the 
FTC and Congress can take to resolve this impasse, providing a 
forum for stakeholder negotiations that facilitates new norms and 
standards that can benefit both retailers and consumers. 
IV. PROPOSAL: COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AS A  
REGULATORY APPROACH 
This Note has highlighted specific privacy harms that may befall 
consumers from the collection of personal data through facial 
recognition in retail settings. This Note recognizes that the use of 
facial recognition is still relatively new in the consumer sector and, 
as such, comprehensive industry norms and standards have yet to 
emerge. While there are privacy risks inherent as the technology 
develops, there are also potential benefits for consumers.407 Even 
with increased media coverage and consumer anxiety towards the 
invasiveness of facial recognition, few consumers have changed 
their behavior, boycotted invasive tech firms, or exercised the 
nominal digital rights they possess.408 Where applicable, right-based 
regimes, like BIPA, are ill-suited to address the massive information 
gap between individuals’ knowledge and that of corporate actors.409 
Ongoing emphasis on autonomy and control ultimately requires 
individual-level data management that is time-consuming and 
complex especially where facial recognition technology is designed 
to be obscure.410 This asymmetry becomes easily exploitable by 
consent-oriented approaches that have tendencies towards rent 
extraction and illusory choices rather than meaningful 
protections.411 These potential limitations are especially relevant 
given the interest of various states and municipalities—including 
New York City—in creating biometric privacy laws enforceable by 
 
406 Kaminski, supra note 399, at 948–49. 
407 See supra Section I.C. 
408 See supra Section III.A. 
409 See supra Section III.A.1. 
410 See Woodrow Hartzog, Opinions: The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 423, 426-31 (2018). 
411 See supra Section III.A. 
2019] THE FUTURE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION NOT FULLY KNOWN 675 
 
private rights of action, with the potential for expansive (and 
expensive) litigation.412 Facial recognition presents an issue of 
systemic management, making individual-rights regimes inadequate 
to take up demands that are impossible to vindicate by individuals. 
Managerial frameworks and industry-based governance have 
thus far failed to keep up with the emerging technology, and often 
fail to fully consider various stakeholders impacted by ubiquitous 
data gathering and use.413 Heightened information asymmetries 
require careful policy interventions to prevent the technology’s 
realizing of only nominal benefits while degrading significant 
privacy interests.414 These potential difficulties require facilitating 
the development of appropriate norms for governing a new 
information flow.415 Instead, approaches have focused on regulating 
through a conservative “light touch” approach designed to give 
maximum freedom to corporate entities pursuant to a neoliberal 
conception of self-correcting markets.416 While scholars have 
argued that the FTC’s emphasis on self-regulation is “more than 
rubber stamp” on corporate interests,417 the overall emphasis on 
consent and privacy policies as the key mechanisms for consumer 
protection have resulted in an incentive structure of selective 
transparency and strategic corporate social responsibility rather than 
market-based regulation.418 While expanded use of the unfair power 
may serve important consumer interests, it is likely inadequate as a 
sole mechanism due to political aversion to a shifting definition of 
 
412 See, e.g., Stephanie Kapinos, New York City Considers Facial Recognition Bill — 
Will New York Be the Next Forum for Biometric Privacy Litigation?, PROSKAUER: NEW 
MEDIA & TECH. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2019), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2019/01/31
/new-york-city-considers-facial-recognition-bill-will-new-york-be-the-next-forum-for-
biometric-privacy-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/TEE5-GJAF] (discussing Bill Int. No. 
1170, a bill introduced by City Council member Ritchie Torres that would regulate the use 
of biometric technology in New York City, amending Section 1, Chapter 5 of Title 20 of 
the Administrative Code of the City of New York and requiring businesses to give notice 
to customers if they are collecting “biometric identifier information”). 
413 See Anjanette H. Raymond, Information and the Regulatory Landscape: A Growing 
Need to Reconsider Existing Legal Frameworks, 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 
357, 358–60 (2018). 
414 See supra Section I.C. 
415 See supra Section III.B. 
416 See supra Section II.C. 
417 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 226, at 676. 
418 See supra Section III.B.1. 
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“unfairness,” lacking agency resources, and the difficulty of 
balancing non-monetizable surveillance effects of facial recognition 
against known and valuable data extraction benefits to businesses.419 
A substantial response is required. As Microsoft president Brad 
Smith, emphasized in December, facial recognition is currently a 
“commercial race to the bottom, with tech companies forced to 
choose between social responsibility and market success.”420 While 
it may be warranted to be skeptical of Smith’s professed desire to 
regulate out of social responsibility rather than the capability of a 
large corporation like Microsoft to compete in a regime with higher 
compliance costs, his diagnosis is likely apropos.421 Until an 
enforceable industry standard emerges, consumers experience the 
ongoing risks of regressive technological governance. 
A. Experimental Regulating Through the FTC 
These signals from industry have been received in part on 
Capitol Hill. In December of 2018, Senator Brian Schatz introduced 
a bill into the Senate that would cover biometric information.422 The 
proposed Data Care Act (DCA) would attempt to update the 
relationships of consumers and data collectors by creating a 
fiduciary obligation in the data collector as a “duty of care,” 
providing the FTC with enforcement mandate under Section 5, 
expanding the FTC’s enforcement toolkit with Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking authority, and making the created 
duties nonwaivable.423 Approaches like the DCA, which 
deemphasize consumer data self-management and emphasize 
incremental interpretative development through FTC participation, 
suggest a trend in the right direction.424 However, the DCA may be 
 
419 See supra Section III.B.2. 
420 Jay Greene & Douglas MacMillan, Microsoft Pushes Urgency of Regulating Facial-
Recognition Technology, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2018, https://www.wsj.com
/articles/microsoft-pushes-urgency-of-regulating-facial-recognition-technology-
1544129253 [https://perma.cc/4YSP-AMUY] (internal citation omitted). 
421 See Kaminski, supra note 352, at 28. 
422 Data Care Act, S.R. 3744, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). 
423 Id. 
424 See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, It’s Time to Try Something Different on 
Internet Privacy, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/20/bc1d71c0-
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limited without accounting for additional factors, such as the FTC’s 
own expertise limitations in making appropriate rules.425 
This Note proposes that addressing the instrumental concerns 
about facial recognition require a systemic shift in regulatory 
approach. Collaborative governance, through carefully calibrated 
public-private partnerships, may be better suited for regulating 
complex systems that create hard-to-calculate risks, change too 
quickly for traditional regulatory approaches, and involve technical 
and industry expertise that regulators and legislators are unlikely to 
have.426 This approach may solve a “pacing problem” because “the 
pace of technological and market change [have] accelerated, both 
rule-based and purely self-regulatory approaches have become 
increasingly less relevant to the protection of privacy.”427 The goal 
of collaborative governance is to exist in a space between command-
and-control and private ordering.428 As a result, the shift to 
collaborative governance is coherent with the FTC’s historical 
relationship to business and facilitation of information exchanges as 
a “norm entrepreneur.”429 What is required for this mechanism to 
work is twofold: expanded authority by Congress to directly 
regulate the facial recognition sector and an agency shift greater 
involvement allowing for the engagement and retention of industry 
participation. This can include using direct regulatory measures 
such as negotiated rulemaking, codes of conduct with required 
agency approval of terms, using legal safe harbors to encourage the 
adoption of industry codes of conduct, audited self-regulation with 
certification standards, and filing and disclosure obligations.430 
Incentive systems can be designed that encourage monitoring and 
 
0315-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html?utm_term=.ee18fb158f19 
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425 Additionally, the DCA as drafted may not restrict uses that result in subjective harms 
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allow for benefits to be recognized by those that are compliant and 
that more immediately sanction non-compliance.431 
While there is some suggestion that the US should shift to an 
omnibus GDPR solution,432 this Note finds that the sectoral 
approach applies a clearer and more granular approach for regulator 
engagement with stakeholders in the retail sector that does not risk 
displacing or confounding consequences of preempting present 
federal and state law.433 An FTC-centric collaborative governance 
approach would build on existing relationships and patterns of 
governance, while shifting the incentive structure of regulated 
entities towards norm realization rather than a deregulatory 
obfuscation. The FTC, by shifting its regulatory focus towards a 
collaborative role, can become a greater facilitator of information 
exchanges, supplying the incentives for the design of ethical 
technologies that enhance consumer privacy. 
B. Outline for a Collaborative Process 
This Note suggests that the NTIA process is not conclusive that 
a collaborative governance approach is unworkable for facial 
recognition. While the NTIA’s failure may have been a result of the 
dissonance between the agencies perceived role as a “neutral forum” 
and creation of a “voluntary” best practices, the FTC’s involvement 
in a collaborative process would be as a direct regulator. 434 This 
Note suggests a multi-step proposal for recalibrating the FTC’s 
regulatory approach. 
Initially, the FTC requires a Congressional statutory grant for 
addressing private sector facial recognition.435 As discussed supra, 
 
431 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to 
Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 472 (2017). 
432 See, e.g., Ohm supra, note 68, at 1764. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and 
Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 922, 927-29 (2009) (discussing the drawbacks of embracing 
an omnibus privacy regime in the U.S.). 
433 See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 311, at 309. 
434 Kaminski, supra note 399, at 948. 
435 While some scholars argue that a state-oriented approach following BIPA is 
appropriate, this Note finds that these approaches provide inadequate protections, while 
potentially resulting in a balkanized compliance regime, a lack of cohesion between federal 
and state requirements for standing, and extensive legal fees for class action attorneys. 
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the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedure imposed by Congress in 
1980, due to perceived abuses of the agency’s rulemaking authority, 
may too greatly limit the agency’s effectiveness at addressing issues 
of emerging technology.436 This Note suggests that political 
reservations towards a more expansive administrative state may be 
diffused by crafting legislation that requires: (1) preliminary 
reporting to Congress clarifying the status and potentials of facial 
recognition technology; (2) a statutory mandate of negotiated 
rulemaking; (3) a modified safe harbor provision; and (4) delegated 
supplemental enforcement through state attorneys general. 
1. Preliminary Reporting 
The FTC’s present employment of technologists suggests 
internal competencies for filling a role similar to the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), prior to its 1995 defunding—
providing nonpartisan advice on technical subjects.437 The OTA’s 
role was to ensure that sound scientific insight from the sciences 
guided Congressional policy choices.438 Reports by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as a requirement 
in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, suggest 
that reporting requirements can increase general publicly available 
technical knowledge in the contentious technological areas, such as 
the cybersecurity of self-driving cars, while offering prospective 
identification of regulatory hurdles.439 Statutory reporting 
requirements could expand the FTC’s informational role, while 
emphasizing non-partisan research goals. 
 
Compare Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (2019), with Rivera v. 
Google, Inc., No. 16 C 02714, 2018 WL 6830332, (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2018). 
436 See supra Section II.C. 
437 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 697, 734 (2018). The FTC is already filling this role in part through 
convening conferences, and other nonenforcement regulatory tools. See, e.g., FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 50. 
438 Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 436, at 734. 
439 Id. at 774–75 (noting that this enabled promulgation of a unique policy calling for 
procedural input and oversight of design implementation). 
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2. Negotiated Rulemaking 
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (NRA) establishes a 
statutory framework for negotiated rulemaking under which 
agencies may bring together representatives of the affected parties 
in a negotiating committee for face-to-face discussions.440 If the 
committee reaches a consensus, the agency can then issue the 
agreement as a proposed rule subject to normal administrative 
review processes.441 While use of the NRA is typically 
discretionary,442 historical reservations over FTC rulemaking may 
suggest political expediency in mandating a collaborative approach, 
with the fallback option of traditional APA rulemaking in the event 
of a negotiation breakdown. 
While negotiated rulemaking has declined in usage since the 
1990s,443 this Note finds that it may have unique propensities for 
addressing facial recognition in retail. As David Thaw suggests, the 
success of negotiated rulemaking in creating an information security 
rule under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA) for entities managing individuals’ sensitive health 
data, is an indicator of negotiated rulemaking’s ability to address 
contentious privacy-related issues. 444 In creating the HIPAA rule, 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), delegated 
substantial negotiated rulemaking authority to the National 
Committee on Vital Health Statistics (NCVHS), a committee 
composed of representatives of private interests and private experts. 
445 NCVHS ultimately created a workable cybersecurity rule, 
generally considered successful.446 Thaw suggests that the success 
of the NCVHS by “harness[ing] private expertise not at the expense 
of the public interest, but rather in support of it” was the result of 
several factors447: First, that members believed that if they failed to 
 
440 See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (1992). 
441 See 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (1992). 
442 See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 341 
(2014). 
443 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) 
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 989 (2008). 
444 See Thaw, supra note 441, at 351–52. 
445 Id. at 352. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 335, 355–66, 369. 
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act, other regulators or legislators would act, resulting in patchwork 
of inconsistent local rules that would both be inefficient and could 
lead to increased potential liability.448 Next, that participants role 
having the “force of law” rather than “merely advisory” authority 
imposed a heighted sense of responsibility towards “the public 
interest” in the negotiation’s outcome.449 Finally, that highly 
technical and interconnected problems require nuanced solutions 
where participants’ information sharing ultimately would benefit 
their future compliance.450 
While some scholars suggest that negotiated rulemaking is no 
more successful than APA rulemaking and can undermine public 
accountability,451 this Note argues that because of the normative 
nature of privacy as an allocation of power, regulating facial 
recognition requires the information sharing and collaboration 
emphasized through negotiated rulemaking to countervail 
information asymmetries.452 The FTC, by initiating and maintaining 
a collaborative process with the flexibility to convene a larger 
committee on privacy and technology, and then creating stakeholder 
subcommittees on topics such as “the use of facial recognition in 
retail,” can facilitate emerging norms with greater dexterity towards 
both the future development of the technology and granularity of the 
privacy risks and expectations in differing sectors. 
Facilitating engagement from new and wider ranges of inter-
disciplinary stakeholders can address the technological, ethical, and 
rights effects of decision-making, while simultaneously diminishing 
the hardening of negotiation positions occupied by trade groups, 
social media companies, and consumer advocates that are less 
susceptible to reputational pressures than brick-and-mortar retailers. 
 
448 Id. 
449 Id. 
450 Id. 
451 See William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 
982 (2016). 
452 See Cohen, supra note 91, at 1379–82; see also Thaw, supra note 441, at 353 (citing 
Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 667–
68 (2013)) (“privacy is a normative exercise in making ‘decisions about competing claims 
to legitimate access to, use of, and alteration of information.’”); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, 
Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 355, 413–14 (2011). 
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Imagining this as a generative and creative process with 
participation of technologists can result in use-oriented restrictions 
beyond notice-and-choice and include design-based solutions that 
balance consumer privacy and industry interest. Examples of such 
include temporary anonymized faceprint storage,453 using sorted 
index numbers (SIN) of appearance based facial features that cannot 
be reidentified,454 limited access secure multiparty displaced 
database computation,455 or creating auditable machine learning 
algorithms.456 
This Note recognizes that coregulation has been a central 
premise of proposed legislation in the United States, including the 
Obama Administration’s privacy initiative and bills sponsored by 
members of Congress from both parties—none of which became 
law.457 However, this Note argues that growing emphasis on state 
level regulation, such as the CCPA and BIPA, coupled with the 
general increased public awareness (and anxiety) of privacy harms 
may be the beginning of a corrective. Under such, the “no penalty” 
default will become an increasingly less-desirable posture for 
industry than participation in regulatory rulemaking.458 
Additionally, as the FTC would retain the auxiliary alternative under 
negotiated rulemaking for developing its own rules pending a 
negotiation breakdown, the potential for failure is substantially 
mitigated. While negotiated rulemaking is not a panacea, the 
combination of incentivized opaqueness, potential for consumer 
harm, and lacking effectiveness of FIPPs in retail facial recognition 
suggests the need for new approaches to regulation. 
 
453 William Tyree & Heather Sliwinski, FaceFirst Announces Mask-ID for Enhanced 
Facial Recognition Privacy, Increased Security of Biometric Data, CISION: PRWEB (Nov. 
13, 2018), https://www.prweb.com/releases/facefirst_announces_mask_id_for_enhanced
_facial_recognition_privacy_increased_security_of_biometric_data/prweb15907135.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FM3D-TBPL]. 
454 See generally Yongjun Wang & Dimitrios Hatzinakos, Face Recognition with 
Enhanced Privacy Protections, in IEEE INT’L CONFERENCE ON ACOUSTICS, SPEECH AND 
SIGNAL PROCESSING 835 (2009). 
455 Erkin Zekeriya et al., Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition, in PRIVACY ENHANCING 
TECH.: LECTURE NOTES IN COMP. SCI. 5672 (Ian Goldberg & M. Atallah eds., 2009). 
456 Raymond, supra note 413, at 397–401. 
457 See McGeveran, supra note 447, at 981–82. 
458 See Kaminski, supra note 399, at 947. 
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3. Safe Harbor 
While at present the FTC likely still lacks the ability to be a true 
“regulatory hammer,”459 this Note suggests that the Child Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) is sign that the FTC has already 
been operating with a receptiveness for a broader collaborative 
approach.460 Current FTC enforcement of COPPA suggests that the 
FTC is capable of a regulatory approach that balances the benefits 
of collaborative governance mechanisms with more restrictive 
privacy enforcement mechanisms including monetary fines.461 In 
expanding the FTC’s authority under COPPA, Congress required 
establishment of a co-regulatory regime through a safe harbor—
tiered liability incentivizing compliance in the absence of regulatory 
action.462 This accomplishes the dual interests of providing 
justification for greater authority to issue monetary penalties against 
“bad actors,” while limiting the political blowback from requiring a 
large-scale expansion of the FTC.463 
Under the safe harbor, a regulated entity may satisfy the 
requirements of rules by following a set of practice-based guidelines 
and being deemed in compliance by an authority authorized by the 
FTC.464 The COPPA safe harbor, as an example, may have proven 
too lenient of a standard for compliance with minimal regulator 
 
459 Id. 
460 See Rubinstein, supra note 448, at 395–99. 
461 See id. 
462 15 U.S.C.A. § 6503 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5); see also Rubinstein, supra 
note 448, at 416–17. 
463 The FTC has brought twenty-eight cases and collected more than $10 million in civil 
penalties under COPPA. Peder Magee, Happy 20th Birthday COPPA, FTC (Oct. 22, 2018, 
10:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2018/10/happy-20th-
birthday-coppa [https://perma.cc/PJC5-M7QT]. 
464 Safe harbor programs must be approved by the FTC. The FTC will approve a safe 
harbor program only after a public notice and comment period and upon a finding that the 
safe harbor program’s self-regulatory guidelines “meet the requirements” of the COPPA 
Rule. 15 U.S.C. § 6503(b)(2). Specifically, a safe harbor program must: (1) “provide 
substantially the same or greater protections for children” as the COPPA Rule; (2) 
implement “[a]n effective, mandatory mechanism for the independent assessment” of 
operators’ compliance that includes “a comprehensive review” of each operators’ 
“information policies, practices, and representations”; and (3) impose “[d]isciplinary 
actions for subject operators’ non-compliance with self-regulatory program guidelines.” 16 
C.F.R. § 312.11(b) (Westlaw, Westlaw through 2019). 
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follow up beyond self-certification.465 However, as Ira Rubinstein 
suggests, the safe harbor requirement can be used as a “carrot” 
available to parties that go beyond baseline requirements, pushing 
industry norms towards a more consumer privacy-respecting 
stance.466 Using a safe harbor to incentivize greater sharing of 
privacy-performance enhancing practices and corporate governance 
methodologies can improve information available to market 
participants while rewarding performance with reduced liability and 
possible consumer good will.467 In subsequent steps, a rule issued 
could empower a not-for-profit entity to provide benchmarking and 
certification of compliance.468 
4. Supplemental Enforcement 
A statute authorizing FTC regulation of facial recognition could 
supplement its effectiveness by allowing enforcement by state 
attorneys general. As Danielle Citron has noted, state attorneys 
general can address privacy-related harms effectively because they 
are closer to the problems, accountable to their voters, and face 
fewer bureaucratic requirements.469 Similar to recent attorney 
general enforcement actions under COPPA,470 FTC authority could 
 
465 See, e.g., New York AG Determines TRUSTe’s COPPA Safe Harbor Program Falls 
Short, WINSTON & STRAWN (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-
corner/new-york-ag-determines-truste-s-coppa-safe-harbor-program-falls.html 
[https://perma.cc/7BX9-PMQ6] (discussing a lawsuit settled with the New York AG 
against a private COPPA safe harbor compliance where it failed to adequately review 
program members’ websites to ensure compliance with COPPA). Additionally, this Note 
argues that setting compliance, as COPPA does, exclusively on notice-based principles 
does little to change overall practices. 
466 See Rubinstein, supra note 448, at 418–19. 
467 See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: 
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 246 (2015) (“Our 
research suggests instead that the countries that pushed more of the responsibility for 
meaningfully defining, interpreting, and enforcing privacy back toward corporations were 
rewarded with richer firm practices.”). 
468 See Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in 
the Coming Decade, 3 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 748 (2004) (“Without 
benchmarks, self-regulation and regulation, for that matter, have no clear metrics for 
measuring success.”). 
469 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 750 (2016). 
470 See, e.g., Sapna Maheshwari, Oath Agrees to $5 Million Settlement Over Children’s 
Privacy Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03
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be supplemented by classifying a violation of facial recognition 
rules as a per se “unfair or deceptive act or practice” allowing for 
state level enforcement under UDAP statutes.471 State attorneys 
general, by supplementing the investigative and enforcement 
resources of the FTC, can emphasize the importance of compliance 
without creating additional uncertainty of balkanized or 
contradictory privacy regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
Governing facial recognition technology is difficult. The 
technology is inherently opaque and in tension between anxieties of 
digital instrumentalization and technological idealism. However, 
corporate surveillance in retail risks creating extensive consumer 
profiles that can undermine important civil liberties, and which 
consumers cannot easily avoid or adequately manage. Facial 
recognition needs stringent regulation to protect the public interest. 
Taking only an individual-rights approach risks failing to correct 
systemic problems while increasing the self-management 
requirements of consumers who are already susceptible to a 
widening information deficit. The “light touch” self-regulatory 
model risks being outpaced by technological change and overly 
permissive standards. This Note finds that movement towards a 
collaborative governance with an emphasis on negotiated 
rulemaking is required to provide the flexibility and expertise 
needed to regulate an emerging technology, while correcting 
incentives towards producing enforceable standards. 
 
/business/media/oath-children-online-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/G9XF-CS6C] 
(discussing the settlement with the New York attorney general that is the largest a company 
has paid for a case associated with COPPA). 
471 UDAP stands for Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive Acts or Practices. See 15 U.S.C.A § 
6504 (Westlaw, Westlaw through 2019). 
